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SUMMARY
Affordable housing and a manageable commute are central to the well-being of Calgarians. Yet among 
larger Canadian metropolitan areas today, Calgary already has close to the most expensive housing, and the 
average journey-to-work time, close to 30 minutes, is as high today as it was in Los Angeles in 2000, when 
Los Angeles had a population 10 times larger.
Decisions around how Calgary grows are based on the policies within The City’s Municipal Development Plan 
and the Calgary Transportation Plan, which together provide a blueprint for Calgary’s spatial development 
and transportation system. These plans— and therefore, their assumptions about future effects on congestion 
and rents — are based around a population forecast that does not reflect the historical growth pattern of the 
city and legitimizes spatial containment.
The shortcomings in these plans, both adopted in 2009, are likely to result in longer commuting times and 
even more expensive real estate prices. These will be well beyond what The City has prepared citizens to 
expect and accept, as planners plow ahead with proposals to further entrench the downtown as the dominant 
employment centre. Calgarians need to be levelled with about the realities that come with pursuing a plan 
that calls for spatial containment and intensification centred on a single, dominant central business district.
The plans present a vision of the “Good Urban Life,” and propose to enforce it through a particular choice 
of transportation system, through land-use regulation, and through a downtown parking freeze, with little 
regard to economics. The cost of this vision will in turn discourage new firms and new people from moving 
to Calgary.
Calgarians should be informed about future transportation costs – for mass transit and automobiles – in 
congestion, time, and funding. And they must be informed about the effects this will all have on the cost 
of property for families and businesses. Only then can citizens properly consider their options and choose 
their city’s future. Without that Calgarians may find their quality of life diminished in ways they were never 
prepared to expect.
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1INTRODUCTION
Calgary’s urban spatial structure is anomalous, at least by the standards of cities in the United 
States1 and when compared to its neighbour to the north, Edmonton. Calgary is an “automobile 
city” — a city that has seen the bulk of its growth occur during the era of widespread car 
ownership. In American automobile cities such as Dallas, Houston, Denver, Phoenix, Salt 
Lake City, Las Vegas, and Tucson, employment is highly decentralized and dispersed, with a 
well-developed system of employment subcentres outside the central business district (CBD). 
Also, mass-transit plays only a minor role in those cities’ transportation systems and is 
primarily utilized by non-car owners, especially immigrants and the disadvantaged. In contrast, 
in Calgary, non-local employment is highly centralized in the CBD, with no employment 
subcentres outside the central city that are even medium-sized. And while the car is the 
dominant mode of travel, mass-transit plays an essential role, particularly in the journey to work 
to the CBD. 
In January 2005, the City of Calgary launched a planning process, known as 
imagineCALGARY, aimed at shaping the city’s future. Utilizing a “communicative-planning” 
approach — which favours the mediation of community discourse rather that the creation of 
a technically rational plan2 — city planners received input from 18,000 residents. The result 
of this 18-month-long process was the “imagineCALGARY Plan for Long Range Urban 
Sustainability” published in September 2007. Using imagineCALGARY as a jumping-off 
point, a comprehensive review of Calgary’s Municipal Development Plan and Transportation 
Plan, known as “Plan It Calgary,” was launched. The imagineCALGARY Plan and its children, 
the Municipal Development Plan and the Calgary Transportation Plan, both adopted in 2009, 
provide a planning roadmap for the city’s urban spatial structure and transportation system up to 
the year 2070. 
The Municipal Development Plan (MDP) provides an abundance of nicely designed, coloured 
maps and architectural drawings, and heart-warming prose as well as some quantification of the 
plan, including forecasts. But economic analysis is conspicuous only by its complete absence. 
The Calgary Transportation Plan (CTP) is better, at least costing out proposed improvements 
and calculating the fares required to achieve a certain level of cost recovery of mass-transit 
operating expenses, under the ridership forecasts. But it does not address how the ridership 
forecasts were calculated, and is silent concerning implied average journey-to-work times by 
mass-transit and car. As these plans are the product of the same parent document, use the same 
population projections, and focus on the same issues — where Calgarians locate and how they 
move between locations — the MDP and CTP will be referred to collectively as the “plans.” 
Taken together, the planned development within the plans aims to achieve a more sustainable 
and livable city in alignment with imagineCALGARY, through the continued concentration of 
employment in the CBD, expansion of the radial LRT system, transit-oriented development, 
spatial containment of the city, and intensification. However, without solid, quantitative analysis 
of the costs and benefits of implementing the plans, it is impossible to assess their soundness.
In reviewing these plans it becomes clear that the city has a three-pronged plan: 1) to have the 
city centre remain the dominant employment centre; 2) to expand the transportation system by 
1 The essay uses the term “urban” to refer both to the city of Calgary and to the entire metropolitan area.
2 S. Campbell and S. Fainstein, Readings in Planning Theory (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2003).
2emphasizing CBD-oriented mass-transit at the expense of roads, and discouraging auto travel on 
the downtown commute by imposing a soft parking freeze downtown; and 3) to spatially contain 
the city’s lateral growth. The costs will take the forms of heavy expenditure on mass-transit, 
considerable increase in journey-to-work times and in auto traffic congestion, and significant 
increases in rents and property values. As well, the high cost to firms of operating in Calgary, 
as well as the high cost of living, will discourage new firms from moving to or starting up in 
Calgary, which can be expected to slow growth. These costs will be significantly higher the 
higher the rate of population growth. 
The outcome may be even worse if the city removes only one of the three prongs from its 
planning framework. Suppose, for example, that the city were to retain its plan for the city centre 
to remain the dominant employment centre and for transportation investment to be directed 
towards CBD-oriented mass-transit, but were to relax regulatory restrictions on the lateral 
expansion of the city. While this would relieve somewhat the pressure on rents and housing 
prices, it would result in considerable expansion of the city’s commuting watershed. This would 
result in a substantial increase in average commuting distance, which would lead to significant 
increases in the average commute time, traffic congestion, and the transportation budget. Thus, 
the plans’ impacts on Calgary’s future spatial structure need to be scrutinized. This essay 
expresses strong and informed skepticism, from the perspective of an urban economist, about 
the inherent wisdom and economic viability of the plans — the city’s vision for Calgary’s urban 
future.
Since the author is an outsider to the city, the arguments put forward are not expertly informed, 
and some may be off-base. The essay will have succeeded in its purpose if it stimulates enough 
discussion to persuade the city to provide the technical reports documenting the quantitative 
economic policy analysis underlying the plans. Made available for public and academic scrutiny, 
these reports should provide the basis for a constructive and informed policy debate based on 
numbers rather than wishful thinking. 
The essay does not consider details of the plans. Instead, it focuses on four broad aspects of the 
plans that may adversely impact the Calgary economy.
1. The plans’ low population projections, which legitimize spatial containment.
2. The impact on housing rents of the plans’ emphasis on spatial containment.
3. The danger of rapidly increasing traffic congestion under the plans.
4. The plans’ resistance to economic pressures for subcentre formation. 
BACKGROUND: CALGARY’S ANOMALOUS SPATIAL STRUCTURE
The evolution of the spatial structure of Canadian metro areas differs in three important 
respects from that of U.S. metro areas. First, Canadian metro areas did not experience the 
black migration from the U.S. South that started after the First World War, nor, therefore, the 
subsequent vicious cycle generated by suburban housing discrimination against blacks — 
ghettoization of the black community downtown, accompanied by white flight to the suburbs, 
3leading to downtown disinvestment and decay, and further polarization between black and white 
citizens. Second, mass-transit usage did not decline nor car ownership increase as rapidly in 
Canadian metro areas as in U.S. metro areas. And third, Canadian metro areas actively pursued 
policies to slow down the rate of decentralization, and continue to do so, which has been made 
possible by less jurisdictional fragmentation and stronger metropolitan-planning authorities. 
Thus, it would be imprudent to compare Calgary’s spatial structure to that of U.S. metropolitan 
areas without strong qualifications. 
Nevertheless, by almost any standard, Calgary’s spatial structure appears to be anomalous. It is 
an “automobile city” — it experienced its rapid population growth when the automobile was the 
dominant form of transportation — and almost all households own cars.3 While its residential 
decentralization is characteristic of automobile cities, its employment centralization is decidedly 
not. Calgary’s non-local employment remains highly centralized. Figure 1 below shows the 
spatial distribution of office, retail, and industrial space in 2013. Three features stand out. First, 
the hierarchy of retail centres appears quite standard, suggesting that it follows quite closely the 
pattern of residential location, with the exception of the high concentration of retail space along 
Macleod Trail, south of the downtown area. Second, industrial space is heavily concentrated 
east of the downtown area. This is typical of cities with prevailing westerly winds (so that air 
pollution blows away from residential areas), and in Calgary this tendency has likely been 
accentuated by zoning policy. Third, office space is highly concentrated in the downtown area, 
with no obvious office subcentres — this is the apparent anomaly. 
FIGURE 1 CITYWIDE DISTRIBUTION OF OFFICE, RETAIL AND INDUSTRIAL SPACES
Source: Calgary Snapshots 2013.
3 There are now more households in Calgary that have four or more cars than those that have no cars.  
City of Calgary, “Calgary Snapshots 2013,” (2013),  
http://www.calgary.ca/PDA/LUPP/Documents/Publications/calgary-snapshots-2013.pdf?noredirect=1.
4Is Calgary’s spatial distribution of employment indeed anomalous? This entails establishing first 
that the spatial pattern of employment centres/subcentres is similar to the spatial distribution of 
office space shown in Figure 1, and second, that other metropolitan areas that are comparable to 
Calgary in other respects do not exhibit the same pattern. 
Urban economists have an established method of identifying subcentres. First, data are 
collected on employment and employment density by traffic-analysis zone (TAZ). Second, an 
employment subcentre is defined to be a set of contiguous TAZs having the properties that 
each of the constituent TAZs has an employment density exceeding a level d (the employment 
density cut-off) and that the set of contiguous TAZs together has total employment exceeding D 
(the employment cut-off). This method was proposed and first applied by Giuliano and Small4 
to the Los Angeles Metropolitan Area. The subcentres so defined are areas of high absolute 
employment densities. The method has subsequently been applied to many other cities. The 
original application to Los Angeles identified many employment subcentres in Los Angeles and 
Orange counties, but none in the peripheral counties of Riverside, San Bernardino, and Ventura. 
Applying the Giuliano and Small method to Calgary identified zero subcentres, which supports 
the impression conveyed by Figure 1.
Recognizing that it is important to identify peripheral as well as central subcentres, researchers 
have adapted the Giuliano and Small method to take into account not only absolute but also 
relative employment density. Ban and Arnott5 (BA hereafter) is perhaps the simplest method. 
First, it estimates the employment density gradient for the metropolitan area under study, 
which is the average proportional rate at which employment density falls off with distance from 
the city centre (e.g., 0.20 — or 20 per cent — per kilometer). Second, it defines the subcentre 
employment density and employment cut-offs so that they fall off at a rate equal to one-half the 
employment-density gradient. The results are shown in Figure 2. For the city of Calgary itself, 
the BA method identifies four employment centres. There is the central city, which includes the 
CBD, inner-city neighbourhoods, such as the Beltline, Mission and Sunalta, as well as North 
Hill/SAIT Polytechnic along 16th Ave. NW. And there are three employment subcentres: one 
that stretches along the west and south periphery of the airport and includes the Peter Lougheed 
Hospital, Sunridge Mall and business and retail areas along Barlow Trail, 36th Street, Memorial 
Drive and 32nd Avenue NE; a second that stretches from the Chinook Centre to Southcentre 
malls along Macleod Trail, and includes the predominantly industrial Alyth/Bonnybrook/
Manchester neighbourhood; and a third that is centred in the Midnapore and Shawnessy 
neighbourhoods, including the Shawnessy shopping centre and Midpark and Sunpark business 
parks along the southern end of Macleod Trail. The approach also identifies eight regional 
subcentres outside the city limits, two of which are shown in Figure 2 (the city of Airdrie and 
the town of Cochrane), but no subcentres at the periphery of the city (peripheral subcentres can 
be interpreted as emerging subcentres). Thus, the BA analysis of subcentres is broadly consistent 
with the spatial structure of employment conveyed by Figure 1. 
4 G. Giuliano and K. Small, “Subcentres in the Los Angeles region,” Regional Science and Urban Economics 21 (1991):  
163-182.
5 J. Ban and R. Arnott, “Identifying employment subcentres: The method of exponentially declining cutoffs,” Draft (2014). 
5FIGURE 2 EMPLOYMENT SUBCENTRES IN THE CALGARY REGION, 2014 
Prepared by Jifei Ban, using TAZ employment data provided by the City of Calgary.
It is interesting to compare Figure 2 to the city’s depiction of Calgary’s “activity centres” 
displayed in Figure 3. The figure is drawn at a finer spatial scale than is Figure 2. Four of the 
major activity centres (MACs) in Figure 3 overlap the city subcentres identified by the BA 
method: the first is centred on Sunridge Mall, the second is in Midnapore, and a third and 
fourth around the Chinook Centre and Southcentre malls that are contiguous in the BA model. 
Notably missing from the BA model are the MACs in Crowfoot Village and University of 
Calgary/Foothills Hospital/Alberta Children’s Hospital in the city’s northwest, and Mount Royal 
University in the west end. As well, the relatively new Springbank Hill and Seton MACs in the 
far west and southeast respectively are not mature enough to register in the BA model.
Comparison of Figure 3 with Figure 4, which displays the Calgary LRT Network Plan, shows 
that many of the remaining community-activity centres lie on existing or planned LRT lines, 
or are planned MACs themselves (as is the case with the remaining MACs identified in the far 
north and northwest).
6FIGURE 3 EMPLOYMENT CENTRES AND LANDS IN CALGARY 2006 
Source: City of Calgary online “MDP Maps.”
7FIGURE 4 CALGARY LRT NETWORK PLAN
Map created using data from Calgary Transit, Calgary LRT Network Plan, page 4 and  
http://www.calgary.ca/Transportation/TI/Pages/Transit-projects/Green-line/map.aspx
Legend
  Red Line (20 stations)
  Blue Line (16 stations)
  Downtown Free Fare Zone 
  (9 stations)
  Green Line (15 stations 
  identified for SE leg)
8Outside the CBD, Calgary has no areas identified as subcentres according to the Giuliano-Small 
definition, which is based on absolute employment density, but three subcentres according to 
the Ban-Arnott definition, which is based on a mix of absolute and relative employment density. 
Exact comparison of Calgary’s spatial structure of employment to that of other cities is difficult. 
There have been few academic studies comparing the pattern of employment subcentres across 
metropolitan areas, and those that have been done have used somewhat different methods. Table 
1 draws together the results of different studies done for U.S. metropolitan areas using 1990 
data. Four features stand out. First, the number and types of subcentres vary considerably across 
metropolitan areas. Second, larger metropolitan areas tend to have more subcentres. Third, Los 
Angeles and Houston are extreme in their subcentering. Fourth, Calgary is not alone in having 
zero subcentres according to standard definitions; in 1990, other cities with that status included 
Buffalo, N.Y., Fresno, Calif. and Salt Lake City, Utah. 
9TABLE 1 NUMBER OF CENTRES REPORTED BY STUDIES OF SELECTED METROPOLITAN AREAS  
  USING 1990 DATA
Source: Hanson et. al. 2005.
Metro Area Number of Centres Study
Atlanta 4 downtowns, including CBD Full and Hartshorn, 1995
1 old CBD; 4 edge cities; 3 emerging edge cities Garreau, 1991
4 subcentres McMillen and Smith, 2003
Baltimore 1 old CBD; 3 edge cities; 4 emerging edge cities Garreau, 1991
5 subcentres McMillen and Smith, 2003
Buffalo 0 subcentres McMillen and Smith, 2003
Denver 1 old CBD; 1 edge city; 1 emerging edge city Garreau, 1991
5 subcentres McMillen and Smith, 2003
Fresno 0 subcentres McMillen and Smith, 2003
Houston 1 old CBD; 9 edge cities; 2 emerging edge cities; Garreau, 1991
8 subcentres McMillen and Smith, 2003
3 subcentre rings, 7 employment centres Craig and Ng, 2001
25 employment subcentres (within 50 miles of CBD) McMillen 2001
Indianapolis 11 employment centres Anderson and Bogart, 2001
1 subcentre McMillen and Smith, 2003
Los Angeles 2 old CBDs; 16 edge cities; 8 emerging edge cities Garreau, 1991
12 centres Gordon and Richardson, 1996
46 subcentres McMillen and Smith, 2003
120 employment concentrations (28> 50K jobs, 72 > 10K jobs) Forstall and Greene, 1997
19 employment subcentres (within 50 miles of CBD) McMillen, 2001
Minneapolis– 
St. Paul
2 old CBDs; 1 edge city; 1 emerging edge city Garreau, 1991
7 subcentres McMillen and Smith, 2003
Phoenix 1 old CBD; 3 edge cities; 4 emerging edge cities; 5 expected edge cities Garreau, 1991
5 subcentres McMillen and Smith, 2003
Pittsburgh 1 old CBD; 1 edge city; 1 emerging edge city Garreau, 1991
1 subcentre McMillen and Smith, 2003
Portland, Ore. 1 old CBD; 1 edge city; 1 emerging edge city Garreau, 1991
1 subcentre McMillen and Smith, 2003
11 employment centres Anderson and Bogart, 2001
Salt Lake City 0 subcentres McMillen and Smith, 2003
Seattle 2 old CBDs; 1 edge city; 3 emerging edge cities Garreau, 1991
13 subcentres McMillen and Smith, 2003
Another way to gauge whether the spatial structure of Calgary’s employment is anomalous is to 
compare it with other cities that one would expect, a priori, to be similar. The metropolitan area 
chosen for comparison is Denver. Like Calgary, Denver is a spatially isolated, geographically 
unconstrained, high-plains, automobile city. The population of the Denver metropolitan area 
is, however, about double that of the Calgary metropolitan area. Denver has a more diversified 
industrial base than Calgary, and its land-use regulation is by U.S. standards viewed as 
permissive. Figure 5 displays the spatial distribution of employment density in metropolitan 
Denver. While not directly comparable to Figures 2 and 3, which focus on employment 
subcentres, Figure 5 suggests not only that employment in the Denver metropolitan area is more 
decentralized than in the Calgary metropolitan area, but also that Denver has a well-developed 
hierarchy of employment subcentres. 
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FIGURE 5 2008 WAGE AND SALARY EMPLOYMENT DENSITY
Source: Denver Regional Council of Governments.
Figure 6 complements Figure 5 by showing the spatial distribution of employment density in 
the Denver metropolitan area by industry. Of particular interest is how different the spatial 
distribution of employment density is across industries: some industries are considerably 
more centralized than others (compare finance and insurance with educational services); some 
industries have considerably more dispersed employment than others (compare accommodation 
and food services with arts, entertainment, and recreation), holding constant the degree of 
centralization. Note also that most industry (manufacturing, wholesale trade, and transportation 
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and warehousing) is located in two corridors, one to the south of the central city, the other to 
the east, somewhat similar to Calgary. Unfortunately, there does not appear to be a comparable 
figure for Calgary. The biggest difference would no doubt be Calgary’s considerably higher 
spatial concentration of employment density in the downtown core, where its many corporate 
headquarters are located. Other than that, whether the spatial pattern of employment density by 
industry would differ markedly between the two metropolitan areas is unclear.
FIGURE 6 2008 WAGE AND EMPLOYMENT DENSITY BY INDUSTRY
Source: Denver Regional Council of Governments.
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The tentative conclusion is that the spatial structure of employment in Calgary is anomalous 
in having such a high proportion of non-local employment in the downtown area, but less 
anomalous in its lack of sizeable subcentres.
Why does Calgary remain essentially monocentric — with an unusually high proportion of its 
non-local employment in the downtown area? There are two broad explanations. The first is 
that Calgary’s spatial structure has been driven by economic forces, its monocentricity deriving 
from its unusual employment composition, especially its exceptionally high concentration of 
corporate headquarters. The second is that Calgary’s urban spatial structure has been imposed 
by restrictive land-use planning, which has caused its spatial structure to be considerably 
different from what it would have been if economic forces had been permitted to drive land use. 
Unfortunately, no one has yet come up with a persuasive empirical measure of the restrictiveness 
of a city’s land-use planning. The standard measure used by urban economists is based simply 
on a count of the number of regulations.6 This is not a persuasive measure, however, since the 
restrictiveness of a set of zoning regulations depends at least as much on how permissive the 
local zoning board is in granting zoning variances compared to how restrictive the regulations 
appear on paper.7 
CALGARY’S PLANNING PROBLEMS FROM AN URBAN ECONOMIST’S PERSPECTIVE
Urban economists often find themselves at loggerheads with urban planners. Their 
disagreements derive from differences in their professional biases and training. Economists 
believe in the overall wisdom of the market, though they differ in how important they judge 
market failures to be and in how extensive they judge the government intervention merited 
to correct them. Most economists are empiricists, believing that knowledge comes through 
observation structured by theory. 
Planners are more absolutist, particularly when it comes to urban design. This absolutism often 
extends to a shared vision of elements of the “Good Urban Life,” though this vision shifts 
over time, from Ebenezer Howard’s garden cities, to Frank Lloyd Wright’s arts-and-crafts 
architecture, to Le Corbusier’s modernist monoliths, to the Pleasantville of postwar suburbia 
— with its rigid separation of land uses — and to Herbert Gans’ and Jane Jacobs’ urban villages, 
the last two of which have evolved into the current post-modernist New Urbanism.
Whatever their political colour, most economists have a strong individualistic and libertarian 
vein, which provides the basis for their belief in consumer sovereignty: I will respect your tastes 
in return for your respecting mine. Economists advocate deflecting market forces by selectively 
correcting market failures rather than opposing them. Consider, for example, “sprawl,” defined 
here as low-density development. To an economist, sprawl is a concern only when density is 
inefficiently low as a result of distorted prices. 
6 S. Malpezzi, G. Chun and R. Green, “New place-to-place housing price indexes for U.S. metropolitan areas, and their 
determinants,” Real Estate Economics 26 (2003): 235-274.
7 The permissiveness of the local zoning board is hard to measure too. The proportion of requests for zoning variances that 
are granted is not an ideal measure since it may reflect uncertainty about the board’s permissiveness as much as it does its 
permissiveness. If developers were fully informed about what variances the board would grant and what it would not, all 
requests would be granted.
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Thus, the question is not whether cities should be planned, but how they should be planned: 
how extensively, how flexibly, and through what mix of prices and “quantities” (regulation). The 
transportation system should not only provide the demanded trips efficiently and accommodate 
spatial growth, but should also be somewhat directive. Land-use planning should be used 
to achieve its original intent, to separate incompatible land uses, but this should be done 
flexibly.8 Public buildings, monuments, art galleries, and libraries should be provided, as well 
as public open spaces, including parks, since these are public goods, which the market would 
underprovide. But beyond these measures, if the prices are right, the market should do a good 
job of allocating land to not only its highest, but also its best use. Planning, when excessive, is 
harmful, generating inefficiency in land use.
Calgary’s current anomalous spatial structure may be due primarily to its anomalous industrial 
structure, in particular its status as the only small metropolitan area in North America that is 
home to a large number of corporate headquarters. A competing explanation is that its current 
spatial structure is due primarily to planners and policy-makers adhering to New Urbanist ideals 
on a citywide scale. This has resulted in the city investing heavily in CBD-oriented mass-transit 
at the expense of the roadway network, imposing a soft parking freeze on downtown parking 
with the aim of forcing a modal shift away from the car and towards mass-transit (“induced 
demand for mass-transit”) and, through its land-use and other regulatory policies, discouraging 
or at least not effectively fostering the development of employment subcentres other than transit-
oriented development, which entails smaller, mixed-use subcentres around transit stations. 
No doubt market forces and planning ideology have both contributed to Calgary’s current 
anomalous spatial structure. The big issue facing Calgarians now is whether to support their 
decision-makers in continuing the centralizing land-use and transportation policies of the last 
30 or 40 years that foster the dominance of the CBD as an employment centre, or whether to 
resist established planning practice by supporting the formation of employment subcentres, the 
redirection of transportation investment towards roads, and the spatial expansion of the city both 
inside and outside the city boundary. 
In the economists’ ideal world, in which everything is priced efficiently, the economist’s advice 
would be “let the market decide.” This would entail congestion-pricing all roads and using the 
surplus from the revenue collected that is in excess of the operating cost and amortized capital 
cost to finance new road construction. It would also entail marginal-cost pricing of mass-transit, 
and using the surplus from the revenue collected, in excess of the operating cost and amortized 
capital cost, as well as the lump-sum subsidy deriving from mass-transit’s increasing returns to 
scale, to finance capacity expansion. It would also entail land use being driven by the market, 
with zoning being used only to separate incompatible land uses. But we live in a world that is 
very different from the economists’ ideal world, where, therefore, all policy choices are “second 
best.” 
From this perspective, in general, planners’ opposition to market outcomes is not necessarily 
misguided. But the city’s plans for the next half-century almost certainly are. The city’s plans 
are at least coherent, and if policy follows the plans, the results will not be disastrous. But, 
8 The rigid separation of land uses characteristic of most American (i.e., both U.S. and Canadian) cities since the 1920s 
is called Euclidean zoning, but not after Euclid, the geometer, but after a landmark U.S. court case, Euclid v. Ambler, in 
the 1920s. Recently, there has been a reaction against what is now called “Euclidean I” zoning, and a movement towards 
“Euclidean II” zoning, which is a more flexible zoning system that accommodates mixed land uses.
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especially if population growth continues to exceed its low official projection, following the 
plans will likely be very costly in terms of both the cost of living and the quality of life.
However, plans are not policy or even proposed policy. They are consensus documents forged 
after years of negotiation among the major players that provide a vision to guide future policy 
design. Ambiguous wording masks disagreements and issues that remain to be resolved. Behind 
a plan, there should be a mass of technical reports that document the forecasts underlying the 
plan and report on the costs and feasibility of a wide range of policy options that have been 
considered. These reports, which may be done either by technical experts within the planning 
department or by outside contractors, should be publicly accessible so that they can inform the 
public debate. 
The reports that are publicly available from the City of Calgary’s Planning and Transportation 
departments contain much unnecessary detail, provide only a fuzzy analytical framework, 
and fail to get at the central economic issues, which together suggest that the internal technical 
analysis undertaken by the departments is weak. In light of these concerns, the author undertook 
rough forecasts of some central effects of the plans for four scenarios or cases. Throughout the 
paper, dollar magnitudes are in constant (inflation-adjusted) dollars.
Case I: Plan population growth rate and containment — corresponds to a stylized 
representation of the MDP and CTP, with the city’s population forecast and spatial containment 
(which is treated here as zero growth in the city’s residential land area and in the average 
commuting-trip distance). Population grows at an annual rate of 1.275 per cent, per capita 
income grows at 1.0 per cent, the transit capital stock grows at 2.0 per cent and the auto capital 
stock at 1.0 per cent.
Case II: Plan population growth rate and laissez-faire — Case II is the same as Case I 
except that the city is allowed to expand outward at the “natural” rate. Following Angel et al.,9 
the natural rate of growth of built-up urban area equals 0.6 times the growth rate in per capita 
income plus 0.8 times the growth rate in population, which equals 1.62 per cent per annum. 
Case III: Double plan population growth rate and containment — Case III is the same as 
Case I, except that the population growth rate is double that assumed in the MDP and CTP.
Case IV: Double plan population growth rate and laissez-faire — Case IV differs from 
Case I in that both laissez-faire land use and a doubling of the plan-population-growth rate are 
assumed.
These back-of-the-envelope calculations are no substitute for the more detailed technical reports 
that should have been done in preparing the plans, but nevertheless raise a number of important 
points that were ignored in at least the publicly available reports. 
9 S. Angel et al., The Atlas of Urban Expansion (Cambridge, Mass.: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2012).
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PROBLEM #1: LOW POPULATION PROJECTIONS HAVE BEEN USED TO LEGITIMIZE 
SPATIAL CONTAINMENT
From the publicly available documents it appears that the city built its plans around a single 
population forecast. Plans should be formulated taking into account alternative population 
futures. Not only does this provide planners with an opportunity to think ahead to how the plans 
would need to be modified in the future, should the future population be significantly lower or 
higher than in the central forecast, but also it encourages the formulation of a “robust” plan — a 
plan that can be adapted relatively easily as the uncertain future unfolds.
A major weakness of the current planning process is that it provides the average citizen with 
little information about what the feasible alternatives and trade-offs are. And, at least in Calgary, 
it does not provide ready access to the technical reports that went into preparation of the plans. 
The whole process should be more open and transparent. As it is, the process is unfair. If a 
citizen or academic objects, it is all too easy for the Planning Department to say, even if politely: 
“you don’t know what you’re talking about.” And of course the objector doesn’t, since she has 
little information on the basis of which to object. 
Planners now base their plans on point forecasts. With advances in the analytical sophistication 
of forecasts and in computational power, there are increasing calls for forecasting probability 
distributions of outcomes. This will make the planning process more complex, but will also 
allow the design of “robust” policies — those that do well under a broad range of scenarios — 
and of contingency plans.
The plans are based on the assumption that the city’s population will grow at an average annual 
rate of 1.275 per cent, to approximately 2.3 million in 2070, roughly double what it was in 2010. 
Between 1950 and 2010, also a 60-year period, Calgary’s population grew by a factor of five, not 
two.10 What is the basis for assuming such a rapid slowdown in the population growth rate? If 
the city does grow faster than the plans assume, will the plans continue to be sound? The plans 
are silent on what will happen to population after 2070. If the city’s population continues to 
grow at the same rate as is assumed in the population forecast, or at an even more modest level, 
will the city’s spatial structure comfortably adapt to the continued population growth? In view 
of the considerable uncertainty about the city’s future population, should not the plans outline 
contingency plans to deal with various population scenarios?
The literature search uncovered no city document that gives the rationale for its population 
forecast, nor, remarkably, any public discussion of the forecast. The author is not sufficiently 
well-informed about the local economy to undertake his own population forecast. Nevertheless, 
it seems odd to assume that the metropolitan area’s population growth rate will slow so sharply. 
Despite the roller-coaster behaviour of the price of oil, and the corresponding ups and downs in 
the local economy, from a longer-term perspective the Calgary area seems to have been thriving 
economically. Per capita income is consistently the highest among major Canadian cities. 
Though clouded in uncertainty, the prospects for the province’s oil and gas industry seem good 
over the forecast period. Technological progress continues to be made in the development of 
10 Annexations have had a limited impact on Calgary’s population growth. The majority have consisted of large tracks of 
farmland with the odd homestead; however, in the early 1960s several significant communities where annexed, including 
the then Towns of Montgomery (5,077), Bowness (9,184), Forest Lawn (12,263), and the Hamlet of Midnapore (population 
data from Statistics Canada 1961 Census).
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new energy technologies and alternative fuels, but also in the extraction of oil and natural gas. 
There seems to be little danger of running out of reserves that can be extracted at competitive 
prices. Meanwhile, the metropolitan area scores high in terms of quality-of-life measures, except 
with respect to traffic congestion and the price of housing, which are endogenous rather than 
exogenous factors. There is abundant room to accommodate population growth. At the national 
level, it appears likely that population growth will continue more or less at current levels, and 
perhaps even rise due to increased immigration to offset an increasing dependency ratio.11 And 
with a good quality of life and the highest per capita income in Canada, Alberta can be expected 
to attract migrants from both abroad and the rest of Canada. 
Assume, for the sake of argument, that the city population forecast was made in 2008, at a time 
when the city’s population was 1.043 million. Applying the city’s forecast population growth 
rate to the year 2014 gives a 2014 population of 1.126 million. The actual 2014 population 
was 1.195 million,12 corresponding to a population growth over the period that is 83 per cent 
higher than the forecasted amount. It would be a mistake to put too much weight on only six-
years’ population growth, particularly considering that the city’s population growth reflects the 
volatility of the city’s economy. Nevertheless, the experience of those six years is consistent with 
the city planners’ historical record of having, on average, considerably underestimated the city’s 
population growth.13
The population forecast is central to the viability of the city plans. If population growth is 
modest, as forecast, the city might be successful in implementing its vision of a sustainable city, 
with the CBD as the dominant non-local employment centre, and commuting supported by an 
expanded, radial LRT system. As shall be argued below, housing costs and commuting times 
would likely remain approximately stable. But if the rate of population growth substantially 
exceeds that in the forecast, and if the city adheres to the plans, housing costs and commuting 
times would rise sharply, to the point where the plans would likely be abandoned or radically 
altered.
Even if population grows as forecast over the 2010–70 period, what happens after that if the 
city’s population continues to grow after 2070? If the city were to retain the CBD-orientation of 
its mass-transit system, and were to continue to encourage centralization of employment rather 
than subcentering, the city would either have to expand upwards, causing rents to increase, or 
outward, causing commute distances and commute times to increase.
A Model of the Growth Rate of Housing Rents
This subsection will examine these issues by performing some well-informed, albeit rough, 
back-of-the-envelope calculations. Persuasive quantitative assessment of the plans’ effects would 
require the application of a full-blown computable general-equilibrium model. Nevertheless, 
11 Statistics Canada, Healthy People, Healthy Places (82-229-X), http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/olc-cel/olc.action?objId=82-
229-X&objType=2&lang=en&limit=0. A few years ago the author attended a conference on Australia’s urban policy. 
Interestingly, top billing went to the future of immigration policy, which was viewed as intimately tied to the future 
evolution of the dependency ratio.
12 2014 Civic Census Results, City Clerk’s Election and Information Services.
13 City of Calgary, Transportation Planning, “Mobility Monitor 30: Trends in land use and land use forecasts affecting 
transportation” (2004), http://www.calgary.ca/Transportation/TP/Pages/Planning/Transportation-Data/Mobility-Monitor.aspx. 
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back-of-the-envelope calculations based on simplified yet sound models can yield valuable 
insights. This subsection will report on one set of back-of-the-envelope calculations aimed at 
determining how rapidly housing rents will grow under two scenarios. The first scenario is the 
plan, which entails the plan population forecast, as well as a policy of spatial containment. The 
second scenario is the same, except that population grows at double the rate of that assumed in 
the plan. 
The model has one equation, the equilibrium condition that at all points in time the aggregate 
demand for housing equals the aggregate supply of housing. Housing rent adjusts so as to clear 
the housing market. The aggregate quantity of housing is measured by aggregate housing floor 
area, with no adjustment for quality. The aggregate demand for housing equals population times 
the per capita demand for housing. The per capita demand for housing is increasing in income 
and decreasing in rent. The aggregate supply of housing equals the supply of floor area per unit 
area of land (the floor-area ratio) times the quantity of land devoted to housing. It is assumed 
that the plans’ policy of spatial containment results in the aggregate quantity of land devoted to 
housing remaining fixed. Thus, with spatial containment, the aggregate supply of housing equals 
the fixed area of land devoted to housing times the supply of floor area per unit area of land. The 
supply of floor area per unit area of land is increasing in rent. There is also technical change in 
housing construction. 
The model is illustrated in Figure 7. The aggregate demand curve shifts to the right over time. 
Under the assumption of a unit-income elasticity of demand for housing, holding rent fixed, the 
quantity demanded increases at a rate equal to the sum of the population- and income-growth 
rates. The supply curve shifts down over time; holding quantity fixed, the marginal cost of 
construction decreases at a rate equal to the rate of technical progress in housing construction. 
From these shifts, the rate of growth of rents that keeps the quantity of housing supplied and the 
quantity of housing demanded in balance, can be calculated.
FIGURE 7 THE PROCEDURE TO ESTIMATE THE GROWTH RATE IN RENTS
Note 1: The demand curve shifts out over time due to population and income growth.
Note 2: The supply curve shifts down over time due to decreasing marginal cost of construction deriving from 
technological progress.
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The model abstracts from locational differences and does not treat explicitly the durability of 
housing. In the empirical application, however, ad hoc adjustments are made for each. Richard 
Muth was the leading housing economist of his generation, and the model is Muthian in spirit.14
Application of the Model to Estimate the Growth Rate in Rents under the Plan, 
with the Plan Population Forecast and with a Higher Forecast 
Details of the procedure, the parameters assumed and their justification, and the calculations are 
reported in Appendix A. 
The first row of Table 2 presents the results for the plan, which assumes the city’s implicit 
forecast annual rate of population growth to 2070 of 1.275 per cent, and an annual growth rate 
of real per capita income of 1.0 per cent. This case is termed Case I. The second row of Table 
2 presents the results for Case III, which differs from Case I only in that the assumed annual 
rate of population growth is double the city’s forecast rate. For each of these two cases, the table 
presents not only the growth rate in rents, but also the ratio of the population in 2070 to that in 
2008 (Pop2070/Pop2008), the ratio of housing rent in 2070 to that in 2008 (r2070/r2008), the implied 
ratio of average housing unit/apartment size in 2070 to that in 2008 (H2070/H2008), and the implied 
ratio of the floor-area ratio of housing in 2070 to that in 2008 (FAR2070/FAR2008).
TABLE 2 FORECAST GROWTH IN HOUSING RENT (R), HOUSING-UNIT SIZE (H), AND FLOOR-AREA RATIO  
  (FAR), 2070 COMPARED TO 2008
Annual population 
growth rate
Annual housing 
rent growth rate 
Pop2070/
Pop2008
r2070/r2008
H2070/
H2008
FAR2070/
FAR2008
I: Plan population growth rate 
and containment 1.275% -0.0313% 2.19 0.981 1.89 4.15
III: Double Plan population 
growth rate and containment 2.55% 0.288% 4.76 1.19 1.55 7.39
Under the plan in Case I, the annual growth rate of rents is -0.0313 per cent, which implies that 
the ratio of housing rent in 2070 to that in 2008 will be 0.981 and that the ratio of housing unit 
size in 2070 to that in 2008 will be 1.89.15 Since it is assumed that the ratio of the population 
in 2070 to that of 2008 is 2.19, while the city’s land area remains fixed, the floor-area ratio in 
2070 will be 4.15 that in 2008. Thus, with the city’s population forecast and the other estimated 
parameters, the policy of spatial containment will result in a very modest decline in housing rent 
over the period. The upward pressure on housing rents resulting from spatial containment when 
population and income grow is slightly more than offset by technological progress in housing 
construction.16 Technological change in housing construction is often overlooked since it occurs 
at such a modest rate. Without it, however, a city’s housing rents would inexorably rise as it 
grows. 
14 R. Muth, Cities and Housing (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1969).
15 Since the annual growth rate of per capita income is assumed to be one per cent, and since the demand function is assumed 
to be Cobb-Douglas, per capita expenditure on housing also grows at one per cent. Since the annual growth rate in rent is 
-0.03125 per cent, the annual growth rate in floor area per capita is 1.0313 per cent. Since the developed area is assumed to 
remain the same and population to grow at an annual rate of 1.275 per cent, the growth rate of aggregate floor area is 2.306 
per cent.
16 The rate of 0.6 per cent per annum is assumed, based on M. Iacoviello and S. Neri, “Housing market spillovers: Evidence 
from an estimated DSGE model,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 2 (2010): 125-164. 
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In Case III, between 2008 and 2070 the city’s population will grow at double the rate in the 
plan forecast. This implies an annual population growth rate of 2.55 per cent. Again on the 
assumption that the annual growth rate in income over the period will be one per cent, the 
implied growth rate of housing rent is 0.288 per cent, which in turn implies that the ratio of 
housing rent in 2070 to that of 2008 will be 1.1948. Over the same period, housing-unit size will 
rise by about 55.3 per cent, population by 376 per cent, and the floor-area ratio by about 639 per 
cent. Thus, a doubling of the population growth rate over the forecast period compared to that 
of the plan forecast will result in 2070 housing rent being 21.8 per cent higher than with the plan 
population forecast.
The above back-of-the-envelope calculations are instructive in two respects. First, they quantify 
what intuition and qualitative reasoning suggest: that the viability of the spatial-containment 
policy in the plans is sensitive to the future rate of population growth. Under the city’s 
population forecast, spatial containment is a viable policy in the sense that it would not lead to 
a run-up in rents but, in fact, to a slight decrease. However, under an alternative forecast, that 
future population growth will follow historical experience, spatial containment would lead to 
rents increasing at a rate that might generate opposition to the policy. 
The second way in which the calculations are instructive is methodological. They have 
demonstrated that the consistent application of basic urban-economic reasoning can generate 
considerable insight into the quantitative effects of different rates of population growth on 
housing rents under alternative policy scenarios. In contrast, none of the city’s publications 
related to the plans provide forecasts of housing rents under variants of the plans or under 
alternative scenarios.
PROBLEM #2: SPATIAL CONTAINMENT WILL CAUSE HOUSING RENTS TO RISE
A research group at the World Bank recently examined the historical spatial growth of 
metropolitan areas around the world.17 The studies found an average elasticity of the built-up 
land area with respect to population of about 0.8, and with respect to per capita income of about 
0.6. The City of Calgary’s publications make no reference to anticipated income growth or the 
income elasticity of demand for housing. The historical experience of other cities indicates that 
spatial containment of a metropolitan area can lead to rapid growth in housing rents and values. 
Since Calgary rents and values are already high, will the spatial-containment policies proposed 
in the plan exacerbate housing-affordability problems? 
The previous subsection explored how the growth rate of rents is related to the rate of population 
growth. The calculations there assumed that a policy of spatial containment is in place; 
specifically, that the amount of land in residential use is held fixed. This subsection explores the 
cost in terms of housing rent of the policy of spatial containment, using the same model as in the 
previous section and under the same two population-growth scenarios, the plans’ and double the 
plans’. Except for the growth rate in land area, which reflects the government’s land-use policy, 
the parameters are the same as in the previous section.
17 S. Angel et al., “The persistent decline in urban densities: Global and historical evidence of sprawl,” Draft (2010); and Angel 
et al., The Atlas. 
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The containment policy is naturally measured as a zero growth rate for the land allocated to 
residential use. The alternative policy is laissez-faire. If zoning is in place, it is accommodating 
rather than restrictive. Under this policy, the growth rate of built-up area is calculated using the 
empirical World Bank estimates for the growth rate of the metropolitan built-up area. Some 
additions to built-up land come through infill, but most come through subdivision development 
at the metropolitan periphery. A unit of land added at the metropolitan periphery is less valuable 
than a unit of land closer to the metropolitan centre, and is developed at lower density. For this 
reason, in the calculations that follow, a one per cent growth rate in the built-up urban area is 
assumed to correspond to a 0.5 per cent growth rate in the amount of effective land in residential 
use. With this admittedly crude and ad hoc adjustment,18 it is assumed that laissez-faire entails a 
growth rate of residential land area equalling 0.3 times the growth rate of per capita income plus 
0.4 times the growth rate of population, which equals 0.810 per cent.
TABLE 3 EFFECTS OF SPATIAL CONTAINMENT ON THE RATE OF GROWTH OF HOUSING RENT, WITH THE  
  PLAN-FORECAST-POPULATION-GROWTH RATE, AND THEN DOUBLE THAT RATE. 
Case Annual population growth rate 
Annual effective 
residential land-area 
growth rate 
Annual housing-rent 
growth rate r2070/r2008
I: Plan population growth rate and containment 1.275% 0.0% -0.0313% 0.981
II: Plan population growth rate and laissez-faire 1.275% 0.810% -0.234% 0.865
III: Double plan population growth rate and containment 2.55% 0.0% 0.288% 1.19
IV: Double plan population growth rate and laissez-faire 2.55% 1.320% -0.0425% 0.974
With the plan forecast rate of population growth over the forecast period, the 2070 housing 
rent is 11.3 per cent higher under the policy of spatial containment than under the laissez-faire 
land-use policy. With forecast population growth of double this rate, the corresponding number 
is 22.7 per cent. Qualitatively, this is what one would expect; the higher the rate of population 
growth, the greater the increase in the rental growth rate due to a policy of spatial containment. 
The above estimates are only as accurate as far as the model used is a reasonable description 
of reality and as the parameter estimates are accurate. The model is economically sound but it 
is very simple, perhaps too simple. For example, if explicit account were taken of the durability 
of housing, the housing-supply curve would be significantly less elastic than is implied by the 
above calculations,19 especially in the short run. Taking this into account would amplify the 
effects on housing rent of a higher population growth rate than is assumed in the plan, as well as 
the effects due to spatial containment. 
To explicitly treat the durability of housing would require a model that is considerably more 
complicated than the very simple back-of-the-envelope model employed here. Nevertheless, it 
is possible to examine how a lower housing-supply elasticity affects the results by altering the 
value of one of the parameters, which results in a reduction in the elasticity of the floor-area ratio 
with respect to housing rent from 3.0 to 2.0. Table 4 reports the results.
18 If the more sophisticated monocentric-city model were used, this adjustment would not be necessary.
19 In the very short run, housing supply is almost completely inelastic. Over the course of a month, for example, some 
rehabilitation can be undertaken but no new housing can be constructed. As the time horizon increases, more and more 
margins of adjustment kick in, so that housing supply becomes increasingly elastic. Empirical studies, both simulation and 
econometric, indicate that housing is in fact so durable that, even over a period of 60 years, the supply elasticity of housing 
is substantially below the long-run elasticity employed to derive the results reported in tables 2 and 3.
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TABLE 4 EFFECTS OF SPATIAL CONTAINMENT ON THE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE IN RENT, WITH THE PLAN  
  FORECAST POPULATION GROWTH RATE, AND THEN DOUBLE THAT RATE, WITH A HOUSING-SUPPLY  
  ELASTICITY OF 2.0 RATHER THAN TABLE 3’S VALUE OF 3.0.
Case Annual population growth rate 
Annual effective 
residential land-
area growth rate
Housing rental 
growth rate r2070/r2008
I: Plan population growth rate and containment 1.275% 0.0% 0.538% 1.39
II: Plan population growth rate and laissez-faire 1.275% 0.810% 0.133% 1.09
III: Double plan population growth rate and containment 2.55% 0.0% 1.18% 2.06
IV: Double plan population growth rate and laissez-faire 2.55% 1.320% 0.515% 1.38
Comparing tables 3 and 4, a lower housing-supply elasticity causes a higher growth rate of 
rents, and a larger proportional effect of spatial containment on housing rent. With the plan 
forecast rate of population growth, relative to a laissez-faire land-use policy, a policy of spatial 
containment would cause rents to rise over the plan period by 28.4 per cent. And with double 
that population growth rate, relative to a laissez-faire land-use policy, a policy of spatial 
containment would cause rents to rise over the plan period by 50.1 per cent, which is substantial 
and more than sufficient to raise strong opposition to the policy. 
The model specification implicitly assumes that builders choose the floor-area ratio without 
restriction, so as to maximize profit. Restrictions on building height and floor-area ratio reduce 
the housing-supply elasticity. Thus, the tighter these restrictions apply, the more rapid the growth 
in housing rents. Restrictions on setback or the coverage ratio increase the level of housing 
rents, rather than their growth rate; thus, setback and coverage-ratio requirements that become 
increasingly restrictive over time cause an increase in the growth rate of housing rents. 
As noted earlier, there is no evidence in the public record that the City of Calgary Planning 
Department has undertaken an analysis similar to that reported in this section. The city should 
do so, paying particular attention to accurately estimating Calgary’s housing-supply function. 
PROBLEM #3: THE DANGER OF RAPIDLY INCREASING TRAFFIC CONGESTION
In recent years, the city has been channelling almost all transportation infrastructure investment 
into mass-transit.20 The Calgary Transportation Plan indicates that it plans to continue on this 
course for the duration of the plan, and is confident that doing so will result in substantial modal 
shifting away from the car towards mass-transit and non-motorized modes. The empirical 
literature on modal choice indicates that very large increases in auto travel times would be 
necessary to induce the change in modal share assumed in the plan. On what basis does the 
city believe that Calgary is an outlier — that the substantial modal shifting assumed in the plan 
can be achieved without sharp increases in average commuting times? The plans provide no 
forecasts of average commuting times. Why not?
20 The largest auto-infrastructure project in a generation, the Ring Road (Stoney Trail), is being paid for by Alberta 
Transportation, and most of the land for the Transportation Utility Corridor (TUC) where it is located was purchased by the 
Province of Alberta, not the city. The analysis that follows ignores the Ring Road. Since the Ring Road is at the periphery of 
the city, it has and will continue to reduce average suburb-to-suburb commuting cost. However, it is unlikely to have much 
impact on average suburb-to-downtown commuting cost. 
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For more than 30 years, the city has invested heavily in the LRT system but little in the road 
system, and has restricted the amount of parking downtown. This policy has been successful 
in increasing the LRT modal share, especially for commuting trips to and from the central 
city. Also, there is at least the perception that, as a result, traffic congestion has substantially 
worsened. Since average journey-to-work times tend to be significantly higher for mass-transit 
than for cars, these trends together suggest that journey-to-work times in Calgary have been 
increasing over that period. Unfortunately, the trend in average journey-to-work times is not well 
documented. The only data available are from the 2011 National Household Survey21 and from 
TomTom for 2011, 2012, and 2013.22 The city’s TomTom index23 rose from 19 per cent in 2011 to 
22 per cent in 2013, which exceeds Boston’s in that year, but this is too short a time period over 
which to discern a statistically reliable trend.
Between now and 2070, the city plans to continue its policy of expanding the public transit 
system, especially the LRT system, while investing little in the road system. This section 
explores some of the implications of this policy if it is continued to 2070. In particular, it 
investigates how rapidly traffic congestion will worsen and how much average journey-to-work 
times can be expected to increase. 
Even though the proportion of all trips that are commuting trips has been declining steadily over 
the last 50 years, urban transportation planning still focuses on the adequacy of capacity on the 
journey to work. There is a good reason for this: traffic density is significantly higher during the 
rush hours than during other periods of the day. One implication is that, if capacity is adequate 
for rush-hour traffic, it will be adequate during other periods of the day. Another is that the 
time loss due to congestion occurs disproportionately during the rush hour. This section follows 
standard practice in focusing on commuting trips: the journey to work. 
It will be useful to start by introducing the standard approach that traffic engineers take to 
forecasting travel demand and traffic congestion: the four-step model. The four steps or sub-
models are (1) trip generation; (2) trip distribution; (3) mode choice; and (4) route choice. Trip 
generation concerns the aggregate number of trips by trip purpose, recognizing that most travel 
demand is derived from the demand for activities, and is sensitive to the money and time costs 
of travel. Trip distribution concerns the origins and destinations of the trips generated in the 
first step; the outcome of this step is a trip matrix. Mode choice concerns the modal split of trips 
between each origin-destination pair, and route choice for each mode concerns the distribution 
of routes chosen by travellers between each origin-destination pair, based on the actual traffic 
network, aggregated to the level of major roads. 
The transportation planner typically has at her disposal two types of data concerning the current 
and past states of the traffic system, aggregate data and individual sample data collected from 
travel diaries, which describe in detail the travel experience of individuals over, say, a week. To 
simplify the discussion, let us suppose that the planner only has data from travel diaries for a 
21 Statistics Canada, National Household Survey (2011), Table 1a and Table 1b. 
22 TomTom International B.V., North American Congestion Index, 2012, 2013 and 2014.
23 “The methodology measures travel times during the whole day and during peak periods, and compares these with 
measured travel times during non-congested periods (free flow). The difference is expressed as a total average percentage 
increase in travel time. We take into account local roads, arterials and highways. All data is based on actual GPS based 
measurements…” (TomTom index, 2014). The city index is a trip-weighted index over the year. Defining “excess travel 
time” as actual travel time minus free-flow travel time, the index gives the ratio of excess travel time to free-flow travel 
time. 
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particular week that specify the start and end time of all trips, as well as their purpose and the 
mode chosen.24 From this she can estimate the mode-specific trip matrices by period of the day 
and day of the week, as well as mode-specific travel times between each origin-destination pair 
by time period. She also has data on the “capacity” of each link of each mode-specific network, 
where capacity is defined as maximum sustainable flow. 
A traffic equilibrium is a traffic allocation such that no traveller can become better off by 
changing her route, mode, trip pattern, or trip frequency. It is assumed that the observed traffic 
allocation is a traffic equilibrium. This equilibrium is obtained through the interaction of supply 
and demand, with equilibrium being achieved through adjustment in levels of traffic congestion. 
On the supply side are the mode-link-specific congestion functions, each of which specifies how 
travel times on that mode link increase with the flow on the mode link. On the demand side, 
there are demand functions, one for each step of the four-step model, which specify the travel 
choices individuals make as a function of the state of the traffic system. 
The transportation planner then assumes the role of a statistician, estimating the parameters 
of the demand functions and congestion functions that provide the best fit to the data, on the 
assumption that the data describe a traffic equilibrium. She then has a model of the traffic 
system that can be used to forecast how traffic equilibrium changes in response to exogenous 
changes in population, income, fares, and mode-link-specific capacities. 
The literature review uncovered some forecasts of LRT ridership and how it would be changed 
by specific improvements to the LRT system, but no documentation was provided on how 
the forecasts were generated. Furthermore, neither the MDP nor the CTP, nor any follow-up 
documents, contain reference to any forecasts of how the proposed transportation plan will 
affect road-traffic congestion or average journey-to-work times. 
An Aggregate Model of Journey-to-Work Times
The remainder of this section will undertake such forecasts, in the spirit of travel-demand 
forecasting. Since doing this at the level of disaggregation at which travel demand forecasting 
is typically done would be a major research project, here the heroic simplification will be made 
to treat the city as a single spatial unit. Most traffic engineers will object strongly, since their 
conventional wisdom is that the more disaggregated the traffic network, the more accurate the 
traffic forecasts. This is disputable. Recent work by Carlos Daganzo (a leading traffic-flow 
theorist) and his students at the University of California, Berkeley, has demonstrated that, at the 
level of the downtown neighbourhood, forecasts obtained using an aggregate (traffic engineers 
use the term macroscopic) model with a more sophisticated25 treatment of traffic congestion 
are superior to those obtained using the conventional approach.26 Nevertheless, since little prior 
work has been done forecasting the modal split and commute times using models aggregated to 
24 Modes include simple and compound modes. “Drive alone” is a simple mode. “Drive from the origin to the subway station, 
park, take the subway to close to the destination, and then walk to the destination” is a compound mode. 
25 
The conventional approach assumes that the travel speed on a link is related to traffic flow on that link. The more 
sophisticated approach assumes that the travel speed on a link is instead negatively related to the traffic density on the link, 
allowing for the treatment of traffic jams. 
26 N. Geroliminis and C. Daganzo, “Existence of urban-scale macroscopic fundamental diagrams,” Transportation Research, 
Part B (2008): 759-770.
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the level of an entire city,27 the forecasts developed below should be received with a healthy dose 
of skepticism. Nonetheless, they will hopefully encourage the City of Calgary’s Transportation 
Planning Department to either release, with full documentation, its internal modal-share and 
average-commute-time forecasts under the CTP if they have been made, or to undertake well-
documented forecasts if they have not.
The Calgary Transportation Plan28 aims to reduce the auto modal share (for all trips, not just 
commuting trips) from its current level of 77 per cent to between 55 and 65 per cent, and to 
roughly double the mass-transit modal share from its current level of nine per cent to between 15 
per cent and 20 per cent. While the plan does not explicitly say so, it intends to induce the modal 
shift from cars to mass-transit not only by extending and upgrading the LRT and bus systems, 
but also by providing little funding to roads, which will have the effect of increasing road 
congestion, and by continuing its soft parking freeze downtown, which will increase the price of 
commuting to downtown by car.
Table 5A gives the 2011 modal shares in the Calgary region for all home-to-work trips29 for all 
such trips with a CBD destination, and for all such trips with a destination outside the CBD. It is 
evident that auto travel is the dominant mode of commuting for workplaces outside the CBD. For 
workplaces in the CBD, in contrast, mass-transit is now the dominant mode. From the figures 
below, it can be inferred that 26.8 per cent of workplaces are in the CBD, which is high for a 
metropolitan area of Calgary’s size. Table 5B gives comparable data for 2001 from the same 
source.
TABLE 5A 2011 WEEKDAY MODE SHARE FOR TRAVEL FROM HOME TO WORK
Mode Home-to-work mode share — all 
workplaces
Home-to-work mode share — 
workplace in the CBD
Home-to-work mode share — 
workplace outside the CBD
Walk 8.2% 13.9% 6.2%
Bike 2.0% 4.0% 1.3%
Auto driver 64.9% 29.1% 78.0%
Auto passenger 6.2% 7.3% 5.8%
Transit 18.7% 45.7% 8.8%
Source: “Changing Travel Behaviour in the Calgary Region,” Travel Behaviour Report Series 2 (October 2013), Figures 12, 
13, and 14.
27 An exception is I. Parry and K. Small, “Should urban transit subsidies be reduced?” Discussion Paper (Resources for the 
Future, 2009). 
28 City of Calgary, Calgary Transportation Plan (2009), Table 2 and Figure 6, http://www.calgary.ca/Transportation/TP/
Documents/CTP2009/calgary_transportation_plan.pdf.
29 Recent data are available for 2014. For all workplaces, for travel from home to work, the auto modal share was 72.6 per cent, 
the transit modal share 18.0 per cent, and the active modal share 7.3 per cent. 
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TABLE 5B 2001 WEEKDAY MODE SHARE FOR TRAVEL FROM HOME TO WORK
Mode Home-to-work mode share —  
all workplaces
Home-to-work mode share — 
workplace in the CBD
Home-to-work mode share — 
workplace outside the CBD
Walk 6.4% 10.9% 4.7%
Bike 1.6% 2.5% 1.3%
Auto driver 69.6% 38.6% 80.9%
Auto passenger 8.4% 12.0% 7.1%
Transit 13.9% 36.0% 5.9%
Source: Changing Travel Behaviour in the Calgary Region,” Travel Behaviour Report Series 2 (October 2013), Figures 12, 
13, and 14.
Over the 10-year period from 2001 to 2011, the auto modal share (driver and passenger) for 
travel from home to work fell from 78.0 to 71.1 per cent for all workplaces, from 50.6 to 36.4 per 
cent for workplaces in the CBD, and from 88.0 to 83.8 per cent for workplaces outside the CBD. 
Over the same period, the transit modal share for travel from home to work increased from 13.9 
to 18.7 per cent for all workplaces, from 36.0 to 45.7 per cent for workplaces in the CBD, and 
from 5.9 to 8.8 per cent for workplaces outside the CBD; the active modal share for travel from 
home to work increased from 8.0 to 10.2 per cent for all workplaces, from 13.4 to 17.9 per cent 
for workplaces in the CBD, and from 6.0 to 7.5 per cent for workplaces outside the CBD. Such a 
large fall in the auto modal share for travel from home to work over such a short period of time 
is extremely unusual among North American cities, and may indeed be unprecedented. This 
fall is all the more remarkable in light of Calgary’s high level of car ownership, which the same 
document reports. The average auto ownership per household in 2011 in Calgary exceeded 1.81, 
and more households owned four or more cars than did not own a car.30 
In order to plan for Calgary’s future transportation system, it is important to understand why 
these remarkable modal shifts occurred. One reason is certainly the expansion of the mass-
transit system over the period. Other possible reasons include improved service on the mass-
transit system, worsened traffic congestion, higher downtown parking fees, and a change in 
tastes. No publicly available studies appear to have been done of this issue.31
Treating Calgary as a single spatial unit, the analysis that follows provides back-of-the-envelope 
calculations of modal shares, mode-specific average journey-to-work times, and overall average 
journey-to-work time. The analysis will also be restricted to the modal split between auto and 
mass-transit. After adjustment for the difference between the city of Calgary and the Calgary 
region, the 2011 home-to-work motorized-travel modal split between auto and transit for 
motorized travel is taken to be 75 per cent and 25 per cent. 
Appendix B presents a three-equation model that forms the basis for the back-of-the-envelope 
calculations. The first equation relates the modal share to the average journey-to-work times by 
30 City of Calgary, “Changing travel behaviour in the Calgary region,” Travel Behaviour Report Series, Vol. 2. (2013), 
http://www.calgary.ca/Transportation/TP/Documents/forecasting/Changing%20Travel%20Behaviour%20in%20the%20
Calgary%20Region_Vol2_v07_FOR_WEB.pdf?noredirect=.
31 Mode-choice forecasting is now a ubiquitous and routine element of travel-demand forecasting. The city must have 
estimated modal-choice demand equations. It should have used these equations to decompose the remarkable modal shifts 
that occurred between 2001 and 2011 into its explanatory factors. If it has, it should make its studies publicly available. If it 
has not, it should do so. 
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the two modes.32 The second equation gives average commute time by mass-transit as a function 
of the mass-transit passenger volume and mass-transit transportation infrastructure. The third 
equation is the analogous equation for auto. Solution of the three-equation system permits 
calculation of the overall average journey-to-work time. 
That appendix also gives the parameter values and functional forms used in the calculations, and 
provides a justification for them. Five points concerning the calculations bear note. First, in the 
base year of 2008, the average journey-to-work times by mass-transit and by auto were taken 
to be 41.4 and 24.7 minutes, respectively. Thus, holding constant the mode-specific average 
journey-to-work times, a modal shift towards mass-transit would cause an increase in the overall 
average journey-to-work time. Second, economies of scale in mass-transit are incorporated 
into the analysis.33 Third, the rush-hour elasticities of mass-transit ridership with respect to 
auto- and mass-transit travel times are taken from a recent study for Portland, Ore. reported in 
Litman.34 Fourth, the growth rate of the number of commuters is assumed to equal the growth 
rate of population. And fifth, annual net investment in the mass-transit system is assumed to be 
two per cent of the value of the mass-transit capital stock, and the corresponding figure for auto 
infrastructure is taken to be one per cent. The latter figures were simply educated guesses since, 
remarkably, data were not available for either levels of investment or values of the capital stock 
in the two modes35.
Application of the Model to the Four Cases
Once again, the four cases shall be considered: I. Plan population growth, spatial containment; 
II. Plan population growth, laissez-faire; III. Double plan population growth, spatial 
containment; and IV. Double plan population growth, laissez-faire. The results for the four cases 
are reported in Table 6. Unlike in the previous subsection, the endogenous growth rates (e.g., 
mass-transit modal share) vary with time. Table 6A gives the various growth rates for 2008 for 
the four cases. Table 6B gives values in 2070.
32 The modal share depends on the full price of travel (which includes time and money costs) by the two modes Unfortunately, 
since data were not available to estimate full prices, the modal share was assumed to depend on the journey-to-work time of 
the two modes. This would be accurate if all other characteristics of the two modes had remained constant. 
33 These are called Mohring economies of scale after Herbert Mohring (“Optimization and scale economies in urban bus 
transportation,” American Economic Review 62 (1972): 591-604.)  
Consider doubling both the number of buses and the number of passengers. If this doubling is achieved by doubling the 
frequency of buses, wait time is reduced. If this doubling is achieved alternatively by doubling the density of the bus 
network, walking time is reduced. 
34 T. Litman, “Understanding transport demands and elasticities” (Victoria Transport Policy Institute, 2013),  
www.vtpi.org/elasticities.pdf. 
35 A table in City of Calgary, Calgary Transit, “Strategic Development of Calgary’s CTrain System (updated to December 
2005)” (https://www.calgarytransit.com/sites/default/files/reports/lrt_strategic_development_update.pdf), reports the total 
value of LRT assets in 2005 (in 2005 dollars) to be $997 million.
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TABLE 6A INITIAL GROWTH RATES IN MASS-TRANSIT MODAL SHARE, MASS-TRANSIT AVERAGE 
Case Exogenous growth rates
Mass-transit modal-
share growth rate 
in 2008
Mass-transit average-
trip-time growth rate 
in 2008
Auto average-trip-
time growth rate in 
2008
Average commute-
time growth rate in 
2008 
I: Plan population growth rate and 
containment
gN : 1.275%
gd: 0.0%
0.0398% -0.272% 0.131% -0.00793%
II: Plan population growth rate and 
laissez-faire land use
gN: 1.275%
gd: 0.81%
-0.0243% 0.492 % 1.09% 0.870%
III: Double plan population growth 
rate and containment
gN: 2.55%
gd: 0.0%
0.0146% 0.103% 0.772% 0.534%
IV: Double plan population growth 
rate and laissez-faire land use
gN: 2.55%
gd: 0.81%
-0.0899% 1.35% 2.33% 1.96%
Note: gN is the assumed rate of population growth; gd is the rate of growth of commuting-trip distance (see below for an 
explanation).
Case I: Since the transit capital stock grows faster than population, and since there is no change 
in commuting distance, transit-commute time falls. Since the auto capital stock grows slower 
than population, and since there is no change in commuting distance, auto-commute time rises. 
These changes together cause modal switching towards mass-transit. The magnitudes of the 
changes are small, as is the average growth rate in journey-to-work time, -0.008 per cent. Thus, 
as parameterized, implementation of the plans would actually cause average commute times to 
decrease slowly at the beginning of the plan period.
Case II: Under the assumption that the growth rate in commuting distance equals one-half 
the growth rate in the built-up area, the growth rate in commuting distance is 0.81 per cent per 
annum. The assumed rates of growth of the mass-transit and auto capital stocks are no longer 
sufficient to keep commuting times approximately stable, and average commute time initially 
rises at an annual rate of 0.87 per cent per annum. There are several effects operating on modal 
choice. Even though average auto-commute times increase proportionally faster than mass-
transit-commute times (1.09 versus 0.492 per cent), the mass-transit modal share falls. The 
reason is that the empirical estimates of the mass-transit modal-share elasticities imply modal 
shifting from mass-transit to auto if travel times on both modes increase by the same proportion. 
Case III: Average commute times initially rise at an annual rate of 0.534 per cent, and there is 
very slow modal switching to mass-transit. 
Case IV: The results indicate that under this alternative scenario, average commute time would 
increase at an annual rate of about two per cent, in contrast to Case I, where it is more or less 
stable. 
Table 6B gives the mass-transit modal share, as well as the mass-transit, auto, and overall 
average journey-to-work times in the base year, 2008, and then in 2070 for the four forecast 
scenarios. The average journey-to-work times are the averages over the two motorized forms of 
transport, and therefore ignore non-motorized commuting. 
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TABLE 6B MASS-TRANSIT MODAL SHARE, MASS-TRANSIT AND AUTO AVERAGE COMMUTE TIMES, AND  
  AVERAGE COMMUTE TIME IN 2070
Case Mass-transit modal share (%)
Mass-transit average 
commute time (mins)
Auto average 
commute time (mins)
Average commute 
time (mins)
0: Base case (2008) 25.0 41.4 24.7 28.9
I: Plan population growth rate and containment (2070) 25.5 35.9 27.0 29.3
II: Plan population growth rate and laissez-faire land use 
(2070) 24.5 58.1 49.8 51.8
III: Double plan population growth rate and containment 
(2070) 25.4 44.1 50.4 48.9
IV: Double plan population growth rate and laissez-faire land 
use (2070) 24.0 95.3 151.6 138.1
The large increases in journey-to-work times illustrate dramatically how apparently modest 
differences in growth rates magnify into large differences over the 62-year period of the 
forecasts. These numbers should be interpreted with caution. They emphatically do not indicate 
that Calgary will have a crisis in transportation if either the population grows significantly more 
rapidly than is indicated in the plan, or if Calgary is allowed to grow spatially, or both. What 
they rather indicate is that, under any of the alternative scenarios, if commuting times are to be 
kept at acceptable levels, the CTP would have to invest considerably more in the mass-transit-
and auto-transportation systems than in the base case. 
Three other points merit comment. The first is that Calgary’s experience over the last 30 years 
of a substantial modal shift towards mass-transit is inconsistent with the very modest changes 
in modal shares present in the scenario forecasts. One possible explanation is that the assumed 
mass-transit modal-share elasticities with respect to both mass-transit travel time and auto travel 
time, which were estimated for Portland, are much lower than those in Calgary, and points to 
the importance of getting good estimates for Calgary. Since detailed historical data on modal 
shares are available for Calgary, presumably these critical elasticities have not been estimated 
because of the lack of historical data on average commute times by mode. Since knowledge of 
these elasticities is essential for the future design of Calgary’s transportation system, the city 
should start right away annually collecting journey-to-work times by mode. Doing so will be 
moderately expensive, but far less expensive than designing an inefficient transportation system. 
The above forecasts were made under the assumption that the only characteristics of the two 
travel modes that change over the forecast period are travel times. In fact, in recent years, the 
city, following Boston and San Francisco, has imposed a soft parking freeze downtown, which 
freezes the amount of garage parking that may be provided for existing buildings and allows 
new developments to provide parking only up to a regulated maximum. The second possible 
explanation for the much greater modal shifting that has occurred in Calgary than the model 
would predict is therefore that the Portland elasticities are sound, and that the substantial modal 
switching that has occurred in Calgary on the downtown journey to work over the last 30 
years is due to the very high downtown parking rates (reportedly the second highest in North 
America, after New York City) that the city’s downtown parking policy has caused.36 
The second point is that favouring investment in mass-transit over investment in the auto system 
will lead to a fall in the ratio of mass-transit average commute time to auto average commute 
36 M. Toneguzzi, “Only New York tops Calgary in downtown parking rates,” Calgary Herald, April 2, 2014, http://www.
calgaryherald.com/business/Only+York+tops+Calgary+downtown+parking+rates/9690733/story.html. 
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time. This effect is compounded by the presence of increasing returns to scale in the provision of 
mass-transit. 
The third point is that the above scenario forecasts are based on only two modes. More reliable 
and realistic forecasts would be obtained by expanding the analysis to treat at least a third 
aggregated, non-motorized mode. If travel times by mass-transit and by car were to rise as 
rapidly in the alternative scenarios as indicated in the above tables, many commuters would 
switch to non-motorized modes of commuting, which would reduce mass-transit and auto 
congestion, bringing down auto and mass-transit travel times. 
The above numbers are of interest, but as important as the actual numbers obtained is the 
method used to obtain them. The method allows a planner to investigate on a broad scale the 
effects of a policy under a wide range of scenarios, and to ascertain the sensitivity of forecasts 
to estimates of the central parameters. Did the city undertake such an exercise in developing 
the MDP or the CTP? Even though there is no public documentation of its having done so, the 
city must have forecast the effects of the plan on modal shares and on average journey-to-work 
times under the assumed population forecast. But perhaps the city did not forecast the effects 
of the plan under alternative assumptions about income- and population-growth rates, or with 
alternative estimates of the key parameters. In any event, in order to demonstrate the soundness 
of the plan, the city should make available for public scrutiny the internal analyses that it 
undertook in preparing the plan. 
Figure 8 contains four panels. Each presents the results in Table 6 graphically. For example, 
Figure 8, Panel A graphs the mass-transit modal share between 2008 and 2070 for each of the 
four cases.
FIGURE 8 FROM 2008 TO 2070, MASS-TRANSIT MODAL SHARE (A), MASS-TRANSIT AVERAGE COMMUTE  
  TIME (B), AUTO AVERAGE COMMUTE TIME (C), AND AVERAGE COMMUTE TIME (D).
Case I: Plan population growth rate and containment.
Case II: Plan population growth rate and laissez-faire land use.
Case III: Double plan population growth rate and containment.
Case IV: Double plan population growth rate and laissez-faire land use.
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Some sensitivity analysis is now undertaken for Case I (plan population growth rate and 
containment) only. Four exercises are undertaken (shown in Figure 9):
A. Double the mass-transit modal-share elasticities.
B. Reduce the growth rate in auto-transportation infrastructure from 0.01 to 0.00, so that auto-
transportation investment just offsets depreciation. 
C. Reduce the elasticity of “excess” auto travel time (travel time in excess of free-flow travel 
time) with respect to the auto-volume-capacity ratio from 1.5 to 1.0.
D. Increase the elasticity of excess auto travel time with respect to the auto-volume-capacity 
ratio from 1.5 to 2.0.
FIGURE 9 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS CASES VERSUS CASE I AVERAGE COMMUTE TIMES FROM 2008–2070
Case I: Plan population growth rate and containment.
Case A: Double the mass-transit modal-share elasticities.
Case B: Reduce the growth rate in auto-transportation from 0.01 to 0.00, so that auto-transportation investment just 
offsets depreciation.
Case C: Reduce the elasticity of excess auto travel time with respect to the auto-volume-capacity ratio from 1.5 to 1.0.
Case D: Increase the elasticity of excess auto travel time with respect to the auto-volume-capacity ratio from 1.5 to 2.0.
Figure 9, Panel A shows the effect of doubling the mass-transit modal-share elasticities. The 
effects are small, indicating that much larger mass-transit modal-share elasticities than those 
used in the base case are needed to achieve substantial modal switching over the period. 
In the base case, the growth rate in auto-transportation infrastructure was assumed to be 1.0 per 
cent. This was calibrated ignoring depreciation of the existing infrastructure, and therefore the 
distinction between gross and net investment. Figure 9, Panel B, indicates what would happen if 
instead, the investment in auto-transportation infrastructure were entirely offset by depreciation. 
The result is a sharp increase in mean commuting times over the period of the plan, with the 
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forecast mean commuting time in 2070 increasing from 29.3 minutes to 40.9 minutes. Higher 
modal-share elasticities would dampen this effect.
Appendix B explains that there is no consensus in the literature concerning the elasticity of 
excess auto travel time with respect to the auto-volume-capacity ratio. This parameter measures 
the “degree of congestibility” of the road network — how sensitive excess auto travel times are 
to traffic density. Figure 9, Panels C and D indicate that, at least under the plan scenario, the 
results are only modestly sensitive to this parameter. 
Taken together, the sensitivity analysis leads to two important insights. The first is that, either 
the modal-share elasticities are much higher in Calgary than in Portland, or the model is missing 
something essential that accounts for the substantial switching from car to mass-transit that has 
occurred in Calgary over the last 30 years, especially in the downtown commute. The leading 
candidate for the “missing something essential” is the rise in downtown auto-parking rates.37 
The second important result is that, to keep average commute times from rising sharply over the 
plan period, it will be necessary to expand the capacity of the road system, and not just spend on 
the road system to offset depreciation. 
The back-of-the-envelope calculations demonstrated that average journey-to-work times are 
sensitive to the population growth rate over the plan period, the land-use policy in place, and the 
levels of investment in both the mass-transit and auto infrastructures. The back-of-the-envelope 
calculations were not as successful as had been hoped, since they demonstrated considerably less 
modal switching than has actually occurred in Calgary over the last three decades. The most 
obvious reason is that the modal choice equation underlying the calculations did not take into 
account downtown parking fees. Thus, the results strongly suggest that the dramatic modal shift 
away from auto travel on commutes with a downtown destination is due primarily to Calgary’s 
soft downtown parking freeze, which has resulted in a sharp increase in Calgary’s downtown 
parking rates. This hypothesis merits further investigation.
Again, the method employed in this section is as important as the specific results. It illustrates 
that quite simple models can be employed to estimate the effects of alternative land-use and 
transportation policies on modal choice and average journey-to-work times. And again, there 
is no evidence that the city has used such modelling in its forecasts. If it has, it should make 
the results available for public scrutiny. If it has not, it should do so. The city should inform the 
public about the costs, in terms of average commute times, of the soft downtown parking freeze 
and of the very low levels of investment in road infrastructure that have occurred over the past 
30 years and that are planned for over the duration of the plan. It should also inform the public 
that, if either population growth is substantially higher than in the plan forecast or the policy of 
spatial containment turns out not to be viable, substantial increases in journey-to-work times are 
to be expected unless transportation investment is substantially higher than in the plan forecast. 
Before endorsing the plans, Calgarians have a right to know the plans’ estimated future costs, in 
terms of travel times and housing rents. 
37 The model could be adapted to account for downtown auto-parking rates by making the modal share depend on the average 
full prices of travel on the two modes rather than, as is done, on the average travel times on the two modes. The average 
full price of travel by auto would equal the average time cost of travel by auto plus the money cost of auto travel, including 
parking. 
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PROBLEM #4: ECONOMIC PRESSURES TO SUBCENTRE THAT WILL BECOME 
INCREASINGLY STRONG
Compared to other U.S. cities of comparable size, the automobile cities stand out for their 
affordability. This affordability has been achieved through horizontal expansion, employment 
decentralization, and subcentering. The Calgary plans, however, talk of spatial containment 
of the city; say little or nothing about planning for employment decentralization (except in 
the context of transit-oriented development) or for subcentres; and, with their centrepiece the 
Transportation Plan, present continued expansion of the radial and CBD-oriented light rail 
transit (LRT) system. On what basis does the city believe that economic forces in Calgary are 
so different from those in the U.S. automobile cities that either strong pressures for employment 
decentralization will not arise, or if they do arise, that pursuing policies that oppose these 
pressures will not severely compromise affordability? 
On Agglomeration Economies
To start, some background on the economics of agglomeration will be helpful.38 Why do cities 
exist? Where, when, and why they first arose remains a matter of dispute since the evidence is 
archaeological. The first historical cities were located at points of natural advantage, on a river or 
sea, and arose to facilitate trade based on comparative advantage. For reasons of history, today’s 
cities, too, are all located at points of natural advantage,39 even if that natural advantage is now 
largely vestigial. 
Today’s cities would form and prosper even if space were completely uniform. If this 
were so, the system of cities would be determined solely by economies of agglomeration. 
“Agglomeration” is the spatial concentration of economic activity. “Economies of 
agglomeration” is a generic term applying to the collection of economic forces that lead to 
agglomeration. The costs of agglomeration are tangible — the costs of goods and people 
transportation, of congestion, pollution, and so on. But the benefits of agglomeration are 
harder to pin down. They are akin to the dark matter in the universe. They must be there, 
since otherwise cities would not form, and they must be powerful to offset the obvious costs 
of living in any of today’s mega-cities. And while their aggregate effects can be inferred, most 
sources of agglomeration are very difficult to measure directly. Cities would form even in the 
absence of production benefits, since at least some people would be willing to bear the costs of 
agglomeration in order to enjoy more social contact, a greater variety of consumer goods, and 
the buzz of the city. However, it seems implausible that the size of today’s mega-cities can be 
accounted for by consumption benefits alone. And indeed, there is a strong theoretical 
38 Classics in the literature include: A. Marshall, Principles of Economics, 8th. ed. (London: MacMillan, 1920); E. Hoover, 
The Location of Economic Activity (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948); and J. Jacobs, The Economy of Cities (New York: 
Random House, 1969). J.V. Henderson and J. Thisse, Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, Vol. 4: Cities and 
Geography (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2004) and M. Fujita and J. Thisse, Economics of Agglomeration: Cities, Industrial 
Location, and Regional Growth (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2002) provide excellent points of entry into 
the literature. Because the area has been so active, both books are, however, already somewhat outdated.
39 An apparent anomaly is Brussels, which is located inland and not on any major river. It was originally located on a river, but 
since then, the river has gone underground. 
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argument40 supporting the case that the primary benefits from agglomeration are on the 
production side. 
Consider a very simple model with two factors of production: labour and land. Households 
migrate freely between cities so that household utility, which depends only on the consumption 
of housing and a composite consumption good, is independent of location. The composite good 
is costless to transport so that its price is the same everywhere. In contrast, housing and land 
are immobile. Compare two cities that have the same natural amenities, one of which has a 
higher population than the other. Figure 10 is drawn with the housing/land rent, r, on the x-axis 
and the wage, w, on the y-axis. The solid curves apply to the smaller city, the dashed curves to 
the larger city. The solid upward-sloping curve displays the combinations of the wage and the 
rent in the smaller city consistent with achieving the common, equilibrium level of utility. Call 
it the smaller-city equilibrium utility curve (us). The solid downward-sloping curve displays 
the equilibrium combinations of the wage and the rent in the smaller city consistent with the 
common, equilibrium price of the composite good. Call it the smaller-city equal-price curve 
(cs).41 The equilibrium wage and rent in the smaller city are determined by the intersection of the 
two solid curves, point Es. 
FIGURE 10 AGGLOMERATION ECONOMIES [ES SHOULD BE THE SAME POINT IN THE TWO PANELS]
Now suppose that the economies of agglomeration arise on the consumption side (C). To achieve 
the common level of utility, holding rent fixed, residents in the larger city do not require as high 
a wage to achieve the common utility level. Thus, the dashed larger-city equal-utility curve (ul) 
lies below the corresponding smaller-city curve. Meanwhile, the larger-city equal-price curve 
(cl) coincides with the corresponding smaller-city curve since, in the absence of agglomeration 
economies in production, both cities are equally productive. Since equilibrium in the larger city 
is at the point of intersection of its equal-utility curve and equal-price curve, ElC, the equilibrium 
rent in the larger city is higher than that in the smaller city, and its equilibrium wage is lower. 
If, alternatively, agglomeration economies occur on the production side (P), then the equal-
utility curves in the two cities coincide but the equal-price curve for the larger city lies above 
that for the smaller city since the composite good can be produced at the common price with 
higher wages and rent. In this case, the equilibrium in the larger city is at ElP, for which both 
40 J. Roback, “Wages, rents, and the quality of life,” Journal of Political Economy 90 (1982): 1257-1278.
41 The equal-utility curve plots the indirect utility function, while the equal-price curve plots the factor-price frontier.
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the equilibrium rent and the equilibrium wage are higher in the larger city. That both wages 
and rents are empirically higher in larger cities strongly suggests that agglomeration economies 
in production dominate those in consumption. The remainder of this subsection focuses on 
agglomeration economies in production. 
The evolution from a manufacturing to a service economy has blurred the division between 
industries. Workers’ skills have become increasingly transferable between industries, with the 
typical individual now working not only for several different firms over his working life but in 
more than one industry. Thus, firms are increasingly attracted to cities with large labour pools 
of diverse and specialized workers. Another major change that has occurred is that, over the last 
200 years, in real terms freight costs have fallen 100-fold.42 Since firm location is less and less 
influenced by the location of either its major inputs or its consumer base, firms have become 
increasingly footloose. Yet another change that has occurred is globalization. Firms must now 
compete with other firms from around the world. In such an environment, the firms that succeed 
are those with the competitive edge — those that produce consistently innovative products 
and adapt quickly to changes in business practice, production techniques, and the economic 
environment. Technological advances in one industry are quickly adapted and applied in other 
industries. These changes weaken intra-industry agglomeration economies and strengthen 
inter-industry agglomeration economies, encouraging firms to locate in diversified rather than 
specialized cities. 
In recent years, urban/regional economists have paid increasing attention to the economic 
geography of innovation. In contrast to the stories offered in much of the literature on 
agglomeration economies, the literature on the economic geography of innovation is strongly 
empirical because there are two strong measures of innovation: patents and start-up firms. 
Two sharp empirical regularities emerge from this literature. The first is that the geographical 
distribution of patents is very unequally distributed. In the United States, the Greater San 
Francisco Metropolitan Area (properly the San Jose-San Francisco-Oakland Combined 
Statistical Area) is considerably ahead of the Boston Metropolitan Area,43 which is considerably 
ahead of the Greater New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago Metropolitan Areas, and most 
other metropolitan areas are not even “on the map.” Patents measure only one aspect of 
innovation, technological innovation, but most likely other aspects of innovation display a 
similarly unequal geography, with New York dominating innovation in finance and the arts, for 
example. Another empirical regularity is that start-ups arise disproportionately in large, highly 
diversified metropolitan areas. Once a start-up’s innovative product becomes well established, its 
production is typically relocated to a non-innovative, smaller, and less diverse metropolitan area 
where production costs are lower. By both these measures, large, diverse metropolitan areas are 
engines of innovation. 
While economists have not generally been very successful in quantifying sources of 
agglomeration economies, they have undertaken considerable empirical analysis measuring 
agglomeration economies. The earlier work focused on how wages and labour productivity 
(value of output per worker) differ by city size. More recent work focuses on how differences in 
42 E. Glaeser and J. Kohlhase, “Cities, regions and the decline of transport costs,” Papers in Regional Science 83 (2004):  
197-228.
43 San Francisco’s prominence is due to Silicon Valley, which grew to prominence due to links with Stanford University, 
which is ranked No. 2 in the world in engineering. Boston’s lesser prominence derives from start-ups that spun off from 
research at MIT, which is ranked No. 1 in the world in engineering. 
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wages and labour productivity, by industry, within a metropolitan area are related to the spatial 
distribution of employment within the metropolitan area. A typical study measures the elasticity 
of a particular industry’s wage rate across locations within a metropolitan area with respect 
to a distance-weighted measure of proximity to workers in that industry and perhaps other 
industries.44
Figure 11 displays an illustrative result from a recent study.45 The x-axis measures the industry-
specific average elasticity of labour productivity with respect to the density of human capital46 
across metropolitan areas. The y-axis measures the sensitivity of this elasticity to the density of 
human capital. Thus, for example, average labour productivity in real estate increases on average 
by 16.0 per cent with a doubling of the density of human capital, more or less independent of 
the density of human capital. In contrast, the average labour productivity in finance increases 
on average by 12.0 per cent with a doubling of human capital, but this number is considerably 
higher when comparing only high-human-capital metropolitan areas. This result suggests that 
the types of agglomeration economies that affect finance are particularly strong in high-human-
capital metropolitan areas.
44 Agglomeration economies across pairs of industries are termed co-agglomeration economies. Because industry-
classification schemes are so outdated, many of the strong co-agglomeration effects identified empirically would, with 
a better industry-classification scheme, be measured as occurring within an industry. The most obvious example is the 
manufacture of motor vehicles and the manufacture of motor-vehicle parts. Another important example is the “logistics” or 
freight industry, which, according to standard industrial-classification schemes, spans many industries. 
45 J. Abel, I. Dey, and T. Gabe, “Productivity and the density of human capital,” Staff Report 440 (Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, March 2010).
46 A metropolitan area’s human-capital density is calculated as the human-capital-weighted average of the human-capital 
density of its constituent counties. Human-capital density in a county is measured by the number of residents per unit area 
with a college degree. 
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FIGURE 11 CLASSIFICATION OF INDUSTRY SECTOR BY AVERAGE AND CHANGE-IN-PRODUCTIVITY EFFECT 
Source: J. Abel, I. Dey and T. Gabe, “Productivity and the density of human capital,” Staff Report 440 (Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York: March 2010).
Empirical studies have produced different results concerning the elasticities of labour 
productivity with respect to metropolitan population size. There is general agreement, however, 
about how these elasticities differ by industry. They are highest for corporate headquarters and 
the FIRE (finance, insurance, and real estate) industries, and are lowest for unskilled and semi-
skilled local employment. Furthermore, broadly in accordance with economic theory, firms in 
industries with higher elasticities locate more centrally since they derive the greatest production 
benefits from a more central location. An important empirical problem that has not been fully 
resolved is how to distinguish between agglomeration economies in production and sorting 
effects. Perhaps lawyers downtown (in a larger metropolitan area) earn a higher income than 
lawyers in the suburbs (in a smaller metropolitan area) because the best lawyers choose to work 
downtown (in a larger metropolitan area) where they can get a larger income premium for their 
skill, and not because they become better lawyers from working where there is a higher density 
of lawyers. Some progress has been made in resolving this “identification” issue by looking at 
return migrants. To continue the example, suppose that a lawyer moves from a smaller city to 
a larger city and then returns to the smaller city. If his income is the same in the smaller city 
after he returns as it was before he left, it appears likely that working in the bigger city did not 
increase his productivity.
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Intra-metropolitan Spatial Structure, Subcentering and Calgary
This subsection relates subcentering to a metropolitan area’s population and industrial structure, 
as it applies to Calgary. The best place to start is the workhorse of urban economic theory, the 
monocentric-city model.47 The model assumes that the metropolitan area has a single dominant 
centre. Land uses, which may be industrial, commercial, or residential, are arrayed in concentric 
rings around the metropolitan centre, which is the only export node. There are three central 
principles:
Principle 1: At each location, land goes to that use that bids the most for it.
Principle 2: In equilibrium, those land uses that bid a higher rent premium (per unit floor area) 
for a location closer to the metropolitan centre, locate closer to the metropolitan centre.
Principle 3: At each location, floor-space rent and land rent adjust such that the floor-space and 
land markets clear.
In the traditional monocentric model, agglomeration economies are ignored. Thus, the 
rent premium that an economic agent is willing to pay to locate a unit distance closer to 
the metropolitan centre equals its transportation savings. Applying Principle 2 above, in 
equilibrium, land uses that save more in transportation costs (per unit area of land) from 
locating closer to the metropolitan centre, locate closer to the metropolitan centre. Thus, in the 
19th century, those industries that incurred especially high costs in transporting goods to and 
from the port or rail yard, located closest to them. 
The monocentric model can be extended straightforwardly to treat agglomeration economies. 
Principle 2 continues to apply, but now the rent premium that a land use is willing to pay for a 
location closer to the city centre depends not only on its transportation-cost savings from a more 
central location, but also on the additional agglomeration benefits from production at a more 
central location. 
In the modern metropolis, agglomeration benefits are, for most industries, a more important 
determinant of the intra-metropolitan location than the cost of transporting commodities. Thus, 
in the modern monocentric metropolis, the industries with the highest elasticity of labour 
productivity with respect to employment density tend to locate closest to the metropolitan 
centre. Empirical studies48 have found this elasticity to be highest for what are called the FIRE 
(finance, insurance, and real estate) industries and for corporate headquarters. That Calgary’s 
corporate headquarters are almost all located downtown is therefore entirely consistent with our 
theoretical and empirical knowledge of firm location in the monocentric city. 
It is surprising, however, that firms in so many other industries also choose to locate in 
downtown Calgary, since empirical studies suggest that the other industries experience a 
47 The seminal work on the model is W. Alonso, Location and Land Use (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964). 
Theoretical development continued at a rapid pace until the early 1980s, after which it slowed considerably. Even though 
it is now over 25 years old, M. Fujita, Urban Economic Theory: Land Use and City Size (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989) provides the most comprehensive and rigorous treatment of the subject. 
48 M. Arzhagi and V. Henderson, “Networking off Madison Avenue,” Review of Economic Studies 75 (2008): 1011-1038; 
P. Melo, D. Graham and R. Noland, “A meta-analysis of urban agglomeration economies,” Regional Science and Urban 
Economics 39 (2009): 332-342; S. Mun and B. Hutchinson, “Empirical analysis of office rent and agglomeration economies: 
A case study of Toronto,” Journal of Regional Science 35 (1995): 437-456.
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smaller productivity premium from a more central location. It is not implausible, however. It 
might be that proximity to corporate headquarters rather than employment density, which the 
empirical studies capture, provides such a boost to their productivity that a downtown location 
is profit-maximizing for them, despite the very high rents there. It might also be, however, that 
a downtown location is not the most profitable for them, but is forced upon them by restrictive 
land-use regulation. Thus, Calgary’s anomalous spatial structure might or might not be due more 
to its anomalous industrial composition than to restrictive land-use regulation. 
Almost all metropolitan areas start as monocentric cities. In smaller monocentric cities, for all 
but those firms that offer local services, the agglomeration benefits from a central location more 
than offset the somewhat higher rents there and the somewhat higher wages that need to be paid 
to workers to offset the higher cost of living they face, which includes commuting and housing 
costs. But as a monocentric city grows, its spatial structure becomes increasingly unsustainable. 
Downtown firms face higher and higher rents, and have to pay their workers increasingly 
higher wages to offset increasing commuting costs. These effects are offset to a greater or 
lesser extent by larger agglomeration benefits. For those downtown firms in industries with high 
agglomeration economies, the higher agglomeration benefits from a central location continue 
to more than offset the higher costs. But for those downtown firms in industries with lower 
agglomeration economies, eventually the higher costs more than offset the benefits. 
The first firm to relocate from the central location to a more peripheral location is the one that 
experiences the lowest net agglomeration benefits (benefits minus costs). By moving to a more 
peripheral location, the firm will pay less rent, and can also pay lower wages since workers 
will accept a reduction in wages in order to save on their commuting costs. Where the firm 
chooses to relocate to is hard to predict. With locations more distant from the metropolitan come 
reductions in both benefits and costs. Since different types of agglomeration benefits attenuate 
at different rates with distance from the city centre, how overall agglomeration benefits fall 
with distance depends on the industry the firm is in, as well as the industrial composition of 
the city centre. How overall costs fall off with distance depend on the firm’s factor composition 
and the spatial pattern of transportation costs, including traffic congestion. Once the first firm 
has successfully relocated, it becomes more attractive for other firms to relocate. Not only 
does the first firm confer agglomeration benefits on firms that relocate to the same location, 
but also by its successful relocation it signals the profitability of its new location.49 With the 
successful relocation of the second firm, the agglomeration benefits at the new location become 
even stronger. Thus, the successful relocation of the first firm may trigger “tipping” and the 
emergence of a new subcentre. The industrial composition of the new subcentre depends on the 
particular pattern of within-industry and between-industry agglomeration benefits. One might be 
tempted to hypothesize that the new subcentre would contain other firms in the same industry, 
but this is generally not correct since, if all agglomeration benefits are intra-industry, one would 
observe only specialized cities. The pattern of co-agglomeration benefits matter, too. Suppose, 
for example, that the first firm to move is a hospital. Its relocation will encourage the relocation 
of the myriad of small health-services firms that may or may not supply and service the hospital. 
49 A. Caplin and J. Leahy, “Miracle on Sixth Avenue: Information externalities and search,” Economic Journal 108 (1998):  
60-74.
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The emergence and growth of the new subcentre will establish new spatial patterns of 
agglomeration benefits by industry, and a new spatial pattern of rents and traffic congestion. In 
due time, a second subcentre will emerge, and so on.50 
The above discussion assumes that land-use restrictions and other regulations impose no 
impediments to the formation of subcentres. They can easily do so, however, through not only 
land-use zoning, but also restrictions on floor-area ratios, as well as building-code regulations 
and parking requirements. A related problem is land assembly by a developer, which is difficult 
enough for undeveloped land because of the holdout problem, but considerably more difficult 
for land that is already developed. Thus, the successful development of a subcentre requires 
more than passive acquiescence by planners, manifest by a generally accommodating stance in 
the form of willingness to grant zoning variances. It requires their active assistance in the land 
assembly process as well. 
Another set of issues relates to the siting of subcentres. Consider the first firm in the above 
story of the formation of a subcentre. In moving away from the city centre it faces considerable 
uncertainty. It has only a vague idea of the relative profitability of alternative sites for its 
business. It must have an even vaguer idea about whether the area it chooses to relocate to will 
be attractive to other firms, and whether, therefore, its relocation will trigger the development of 
a successful subcentre.51 Thus, the first firm will face considerable uncertainty concerning the 
profitability of relocation, which will likely cause it to delay relocation beyond the time when it 
is desirable from a social point of view that a subcentre form.52 As well, when it does relocate, 
there is a good chance that its choice of site will be suboptimal from a social point of view. Thus, 
there is a strong argument to be made for not only active government involvement in the land 
assembly process once a subcentre initiated by the private sector has started to form, but also in 
the siting of subcentres.53 
Because of the uncertainty small firms face in choosing when to relocate and where to relocate 
to, many subcentres are formed by mega-developers, who develop at such a large scale that they 
internalize many of the externalities associated with the market formation of subcentres and 
create the subcentre’s agglomeration economies through sheer size.54
Because of all the market failures associated with the employment subcentering process, it is 
unreasonable to claim that the subcentres generated by the market are close to efficient, whether 
the government opposes subcentering through regulation, adopts a laissez-faire stance with 
respect to subcentres, or engages in policies that facilitate their development. Nevertheless, 
50 M. Fujita, P. Krugman and T. Mori, “On the evolution of hierarchical urban systems,” European Economic Review 43 
(1999): 209-251; M. Fujita and T. Mori, “Structural stability and evolution of urban systems,” Regional Science and Urban 
Economics 27 (1997): 399-442; M. Fujita and H. Ogawa, “Multiple equilibria and structural transition of non-monocentric 
urban configurations,” Regional Science and Urban Economics 12 (1982): 161-196.
51 Some locations however have obvious advantages as subcentres over others. Freeway intersections are particularly 
attractive because of their accessibility. 
52 Caplin and Leahy (“Miracle on”) model this process in the context of the redevelopment of Sixth Avenue in New York in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s.
53 In economic terminology, the process of subcentre formation is rife with market failures. Not only are informational and 
search externalities important, but also there is an almost complete absence of relevant insurance markets that would allow 
relocating firms to share with “the market” some of the risk associated with relocation. As well, there are strategic problems 
associated with land development. 
54 J. Garreau, Edge City: Life on the New Frontier (New York: Doubleday, 1991) provides a somewhat journalistic but 
nevertheless very informative account of the development of large subcentres, which he terms edge cities, in the U.S.
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subcentering brings with it very considerable social benefits. Some central-city agglomeration 
benefits may be lost, but even this is open to reasonable dispute on the grounds that many central 
cities are so congested that central-city net-agglomeration benefits would be greater with lower 
central employment density. Even if some central-city agglomeration benefits are lost, these 
losses are more than offset by the agglomeration benefits at the subcentres and the savings in 
commuting and other transportation costs they induce. 
It is physically possible for Calgary to grow up rather than out, and to remain monocentric. 
But if the city maintains this course, the cost to Calgarians will become increasingly onerous 
and the economic pressure to develop subcentres will grow increasingly strong. Eventually — 
the timing depending on the city’s income and population growth — political opposition will 
force the plans to be abandoned, and subcentering will happen explosively and inefficiently. 
The CBD-oriented public transportation system will be ill suited to the transportation needs of 
an increasingly polycentric metropolitan area. The city should rework the plans, by all means 
retaining some of its elements, but also accommodating an urban future in which Calgary is a 
polycentric metropolitan area. 
CONCLUSION
The City of Calgary’s Municipal Development Plan and the Calgary Transportation Plan provide 
a blueprint for the city’s urban spatial development and transportation system up to the year 
2070. The plans aim to achieve a more sustainable and livable city through five broad policies: 
(1) continued concentration of non-local employment in the CBD; (2) expansion of the radial 
LRT system; (3) transit-oriented development (which entails small, mixed-use centres around 
some transit stops); (4) spatial containment of the city; and (5) intensification. 
This essay has provided a wide-ranging critique of the plans, focusing on four shortcomings 
in particular: (1) the impact of the plans’ low population projections, which legitimize spatial 
containment; (2) the impact on housing rents of the plans’ emphasis on spatial containment; 
(3) the danger of rapidly increasing traffic congestion under the plans; and (4) the plans’ 
resistance to economic pressures for subcentre formation. The overarching criticism is that, 
taken together, these shortcomings are likely to lead to a highly inefficient metropolitan spatial 
structure, entailing substantial cost to Calgarians in the forms of significant rises in rents and 
property values, and considerable increases in average journey-to-work times and in auto traffic 
congestion. These costs will in turn discourage new firms and new people from moving to 
Calgary. The costs will be substantially higher if the rate of population growth exceeds that in 
the plan forecasts. Since there is little evidence in the publicly available documents that the city 
considered these costs when formulating the plans, it appears that the plans are based to some 
extent on wishful thinking.
It is somewhat unfair to criticize plans for their lack of quantification and analysis, since by their 
nature they are visionary and rhetorical. They put forward a vision of the future, hoping that 
working together to achieve that vision will establish a sense of community. Plans are rhetorical 
in the sense that their prime purpose is to persuade a broad cross-section of the community 
to get on board to work together towards common goals. Through neighbourhood meetings, 
citizens do have some input into the process but, with the limited information they have, the 
41
concerns they express are primarily local. There is then the danger that the broader economic 
effects of the plans, which are the focus of this essay, get less attention than they merit. The 
central concern of this essay is not, however, about process, but about outcomes. From this 
perspective, the worry is that the process of plan preparation in general, and in Calgary in 
particular, leads to bad policy choices. 
Affordable housing and manageable travel are central to the well-being of urban residents. 
Among larger Canadian metropolitan areas, Calgary already has close to the most expensive 
housing. The plans call for spatial containment and intensification, for the city to grow up 
rather than out. This will inevitably lead to an increase in housing rents and property prices. 
The plans make no mention of this, and indeed there is no indication that housing affordability 
was addressed in the plan’s technical studies. If it has not already done so, the city should 
commission studies on the effects of spatial containment and intensification on housing rents 
and property prices. It should also make the studies generally available, so that, after appropriate 
academic scrutiny and public debate, Calgarians become aware of the extent to which the plans 
compromise housing affordability. 
The average journey-to-work time in Calgary, close to 30 minutes, is as high today as it was in 
Los Angeles in 2000, when Los Angeles had a population 10 times that of Calgary. Furthermore, 
the limited evidence is consistent with the widespread impression that the average journey-
to-work time in Calgary has been increasing (at least until the recent slowdown due to the fall 
in the world oil price). Calgary’s high and increasing average journey-to-work time is due to 
two broad city policies. The first is discouragement of auto travel, through underinvestment 
in the road system and a soft parking freeze downtown. The policy has been successful in 
reducing the auto modal share, especially on the journey to work, but at the cost of increased 
traffic congestion and diversion of travel to the intrinsically slower mass-transit modes. If the 
city continues this policy, as the plans propose, journey-to-work times will likely continue 
to increase, how rapidly depending on the rate of population growth. The second policy 
responsible for Calgary’s high average commute time is the city’s continued encouragement 
of a monocentric spatial structure, through expansion of its radial, CBD-oriented LRT system 
and through land-use policies averse to subcentre formation. Since, holding population fixed, 
a monocentric spatial structure entails a higher average commuting distance than does a 
polycentric spatial structure, this broad policy will also likely result in an increase in the average 
journey-to-work time.55 The plans do not mention journey-to-work times, and indeed there is no 
indication that they were forecast in the plans’ technical studies. 
The city has been remiss in not alerting Calgarians that following the plans’ recommendations 
will likely result in substantial increases in the average journey-to-work time. An informal rule 
of thumb is that commuters tolerate a one-way commute of up to 30 minutes but that each extra 
minute of commuting becomes increasingly unpleasant. According to this rule, if the plans' 
recommendations become policy, an increasing proportion of Calgarians will find their quality 
of life compromised by long commutes.
Among North American cities with a similar population, Calgary is anomalous in having such 
a high percentage of non-local employment located downtown and no large subcentres. Its 
55 Spatial containment of the city, which the plans propose, will, by itself, reduce journey-to-work times, but at the cost of 
higher rents and housing prices. 
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current spatial structure can be partially attributed to natural economic forces, in particular 
the strong agglomeration economies generated by its exceptional concentration of head offices. 
However, as the city’s population continues to grow, the pressure will intensify for firms in 
those industries that derive the least benefit from downtown agglomeration economies to move 
out of the downtown area, to locations where rents and wages are significantly lower. The 
only accommodation the plans make for these economic pressures is to foster transit-oriented 
development, which entails small, mixed-use subcentres at selected LRT stations. Not enough is 
known about the market process of subcentre formation to assert with confidence that the plans’ 
failure to address these economic pressures at the present time is misguided. If, however, it is, 
and if land-use policy suppresses economic forces conducive to larger subcentre formation, the 
loss in economic vitality could be considerable, and if large unplanned subcentres form, the city 
will be hamstrung, with a monocentric mass-transit system for a polycentric metropolitan area. 
Furthermore, unless Calgary’s population levels off, which seems unlikely, the day of reckoning 
will come, if not by 2070 at least later, since large monocentric metropolitan areas are simply not 
viable. 
The plans present a vision of the “Good Urban Life,” and propose to enforce it through a 
particular choice of transportation system, through land-use regulation, and through a downtown 
parking freeze, with little regard to economics. In so doing, they display both a lack of 
appreciation for the “wisdom of the market” and a lack of awareness of the power of economic 
forces. 
If, having been properly informed of the quantified costs and benefits of the plans and of sound 
alternatives, Calgarians choose to embrace the vision presented in the plans, so be it. But the 
plans do not properly inform Calgarians. Rather than presenting an unvarnished economic 
assessment of the costs and benefits of the plans, along with those of alternatives, the plans offer 
one choice and, through verbal and visual rhetoric, attempt to persuade the unenlightened of the 
virtues of that choice. Calgarians deserve more respect for their intelligence and more scope to 
exercise their freedom to choose.
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APPENDIX A: THE GROWTH IN HOUSING RENTS
A.1 The Growth in Housing Rent: Theory 
This subsection determines how the rate of growth of housing rents is related to the rates 
of growth of population, income, and land supply when sufficient investment is made in 
transportation infrastructure to hold commute times constant. One simplifying assumption is 
that the only aspect of housing that concerns residents is the floor area of their housing units. 
Another simplifying assumption is that land that is heterogeneous in terms of accessibility can 
be aggregated into a measure of “effective land.”56 
The following notation is employed: 
 N(t)  population at time t 
 y(t)  per capita income at time t 
 r(t)  housing rent per unit floor area at time t 
 γ(t)  a parameter reflecting technical progress in housing construction  
 A*(t)  the effective land area devoted to housing at time t 
 hd(y,r)  per capita demand for floor area, as a function of income and housing rent 
 hs(r,γ)  the profit-maximizing floor-area ratio of housing chosen by developers 
The equilibrium condition is that the aggregate demand for housing equals the aggregate supply 
of housing. This is no more than the condition that housing rent adjusts to clear the market. 
The aggregate demand for floor area equals population times the per capita demand for floor 
area. The per capita demand for floor area is increasing in income and decreasing in rent. The 
aggregate supply of housing equals the supply of floor area per unit area of land times the 
quantity of land devoted to housing. The supply of floor area per unit area of land is increasing 
in rent, and γ, which is a parameter reflecting technical progress in housing construction. Thus:
   N(t)hd(y(t),r(t)) = A*(t)hs(r(t),γ).    (A.1)
Since the housing market is assumed to be in equilibrium at all points in time, this equation 
implies that the growth rate of rents is related to population growth rate, the income growth rate, 
the growth rate of land supply, the income and rent elasticities of demand, the rent elasticity of 
supply, and the rate of technical progress in housing construction. Letting gx denote the growth 
rate of x and Ex:y denote the elasticity of x with respect to y, (A.1) implies that 
   gN + Ehd:ygy + Ehd:rgr = gA* + Ehs:rgr + Ehs:γ g γ.  (A.2)
Solving (A.2) for the growth rate of rents gives
   gr = (gN + Ehd:ygy - gA* - Ehs:γgγ) ÷ (Ehs;r - Ehd:r).  (A.2’)
56 Employing the monocentric-city model as the basis for the analysis would relax this assumption, but at the cost of increased 
complexity.
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A.2 The Growth in Housing Rent: Application under Spatial Containment
Assuming that the growth rates of population, income, land supply and technical change, as well 
as the demand and supply elasticities, remain constant over time, and drawing on the empirical 
literature in urban economics for the magnitude of these growth rates and elasticities, how the 
growth rate of rent depends on the growth rate of population may be calculated. The following 
table lists the assumed parameters, defines each, and gives the estimate of its magnitude and its 
source.
TABLE1 A PARAMETER ESTIMATES EMPLOYED IN CALCULATING THE GROWTH RATE OF HOUSING RENTS PER  
  UNIT AREA OF FLOOR SPACE UNDER SPATIAL CONTAINMENT
Parameter Meaning Estimate Source
gN Plan annual growth rate of population 0.01275 MDP
Ehd:y Income elasticity of housing demand 1.0 Muth
gy Per capita annual income growth rate 0.01
Ehd:r Rent elasticity of housing demand - 1.0 Muth
gA* Plan annual growth rate of effective land area 0 assumed
2
Ehs;r Rent elasticity of housing supply 3.0 calculated
3
Ehs:γ Elasticity of housing supply with respect to productivity 4.0 calculated
3
g
γ
Rate of technical change in housing construction4 0.006 Iacoviello and Neri
σ Elasticity of substitution between capital and land in housing construction 1.0 Thorsnes
α Capital share in housing production 0.75 5
Sources: 
MDP: City of Calgary, The City of Calgary Municipal Development Plan: Office consolidation, December 2014 (2015), 
http://www.gccarra.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/mdp-municipal-development-plan.pdf. 
Muth: R. Muth, Cities and Housing (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1969).
Iacoviello and Neri: M. Iacoviello and S. Neri, “Housing market spillovers: Evidence from an estimated DSGE model.” 
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 2 (2010): 125-164. 
Thorsnes: P. Thorsnes, Consistent estimates of the elasticity of substitution between land and non-land inputs in the 
production of housing, Journal of Urban Economics 42 (1997): 98-108. 
Notes: 
1. While the parameters employed draw on a considerable body of empirical literature in urban economics, they are 
inexact. For several of the parameters, the estimating equations are derived from models that are unrealistic in 
several respects, as indeed are all models. The reader is encouraged to rework the calculations based on her chosen 
set of parameter values.
2. Implied by the assumption that the government pursues a policy of spatial containment.
3. The rent elasticity of housing supply is calculated below from the elasticity of substitution between land and capital 
in the production of housing and the land share in housing production. The elasticity is a long-run elasticity, as is the 
rent elasticity of housing demand. The elasticity of housing supply with respect to productivity is calculated below 
too.
4. Iacoviello and Neri’s figure is 0.008. It has been adjusted downward to reflect the rise in the cost of construction 
labour, which the model does not take into account.
5. This includes the cost of not only materials but also of labour. 
Richard Muth,57 the leading housing economist of his generation, argued that, since households 
have spent more or less the same proportion of their incomes on housing for as long as data have 
been collected, the rent and income elasticities of demand for housing must be close to 1.0. On 
this basis, it is assumed that Ehd:y = -Ehd:r = 1.0. The policy of spatial containment implies that  
gA* = 0. 
57 Muth, Cities and Housing.
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The elasticity of housing supply can be calculated on the basis of three empirical regularities. 
The first is that the elasticity of substitution between land and capital in the production of 
housing is close to 1.0, which is the current conventional wisdom.58 The second is that there are 
constant returns to scale in the production of housing. The third is that the factor share of capital 
in the production of housing is 0.75, which is a standard estimate. 
The first two empirical regularities imply that the production function for housing has the form 
H(t) = γ(t)K(t)αL(t)1-α, where, at time t, H(t) is the quantity of “housing,” γ(t) is a time-varying 
constant reflecting technical change in housing production, K(t) is the amount of capital (non-
land factors of production), L(t) is the amount of land used, and α is the capital-factor share 
in the production of housing. Under the assumption that households are concerned only about 
the floor area of their units, the quantity of housing is measured by the quantity of floor space, 
F(t), F(t) = γ(t)K(t)αL(t)1-α. Since the production function exhibits constant returns to scale, this 
equation may be rewritten in intensive form as f(t) = γ(t)k(t)α, where f(t) ≡ F(t)/L(t) is the floor-
area ratio at time t, and k(t) ≡ K(t)/L(t) is the corresponding capital-land ratio. Thus, f(t) = γ(t)k(t)
α, so that α is the elasticity of floor area with respect to capital. The number of units of capital 
needed to provide f(t) units of floor area is therefore k(t) = [f(t)/γ(t)]1/α. Since the price of a unit of 
capital is normalized to 1.0, this implies that the marginal cost of a unit of floor area with floor-
area ratio f(t) is [γ(t)-1/αf(t)1/α -1]/α = n(t)f(t)1/α -1/α, where n(t) ≡ γ(t)-1/α. 
The developer chooses floor area to maximize profit, which entails building up to the point 
where the rent on a unit of floor area just covers its marginal cost: r(t) = n(t)f(t)1/α -1/α. Thus, the 
supply function for floor area per unit area of land, which is also the supply function for housing 
per unit area of land, is f(t) = [αr(t)/n(t) ]α/(1-α) ≡ αα/(1-α) γ(t)1/(1-α)r(t)α/(1-α) = hs(r(t), γ(t)), so that the 
supply elasticity of housing (the elasticity of housing supplied with respect to rent) is Ehs:r= α/(1-
α) and the elasticity of housing supplied with respect to γ is E
hs:γ 
= 1/(1 - α).
A.2.1 Rental Growth under Spatial Containment for Two Population Forecasts
The plan proposes to contain the area of the city, which is here interpreted to imply that the 
growth rate of the city’s effective land area is zero: gA* = 0. Substituting this and the other 
assumed parameter values into (A.2) yields the following equation relating the growth rate of 
rents to the growth rates in population and income under spatial containment.
   gr = (gN + gy -0.024)/4.0.    (A.3)
All that remains to estimate the growth rate of housing rent under spatial containment under the 
two population forecasts is to substitute in the assumed growth rates of population and income 
into (A.3). 
A2.2 Laissez-Faire
The growth rate of housing rents under laissez-faire is calculated in the same way as under 
spatial containment, except that the growth rate of effective land area, gA*, is taken to be 0.3 
times the growth rate of per capita income plus 0.4 times the growth rate of population.
58 P. Thorsnes, “Consistent estimates of the elasticity of substitution between land and non-land inputs in the production of 
housing,” Journal of Urban Economics 42 (1997): 98-108.
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APPENDIX B: THE GROWTH IN AVERAGE JOURNEY-TO-WORK TIMES
The following notation is employed:
 M the proportion of home-to-work motorized trips by mass-transit
 a auto (superscript)
 m  mass-transit (superscript)
 Ti  mean travel time in excess of free-flow travel time (“excess travel time” due to 
congestion) by mode i 
 Fi mean free-flow travel time by mode i 
 Zi  mean travel time by mode i ( ≡ Ti + Fi)
 si mean excess travel time per kilometre by mode i
 fi mean free-flow travel time per kilometre by mode i
 di mean distance traveled by mode i  
 N  total number of commuters
 Ki capacity of mode i in commuter-kilometres
 Xi  other characteristics of mode i
The equilibrium is described by a system of five equations in the five unknowns, M, Tm, Ta, sm, 
sa.
   M = M(Tm + Fm, Ta + Fa; Xm, Xa)  (B.1)
This equation indicates that the modal split between transit and car depends on the average 
travel times of the two modes, plus the other characteristics of the two modes, which include 
comfort, convenience, travel time reliability, and privacy. The other characteristics of the 
two modes are assumed to be constant over time, so that they will not appear in the growth 
equations. The next pair of equations describes relevant features of the congestion technology:
   sm = sm(MNdm, Km)    (B.2)
   ss = sa((1 - M)Nda,Ka)    (B.3)
si is the mean excess travel time loss per kilometre in mode i. Equations (B.2) and (B.3) indicate 
that the mean excess travel time per kilometre in mode i is a function of the total number of 
commuter-kilometres by mode i and the capacity of mode i. For auto travel, this is a standard 
specification; bus travel is rather more complicated.59
The current consensus is that mass-transit exhibits increasing returns to scale, in the sense that 
a doubling of capacity and a doubling of passenger-kilometres results in a reduction in the mean 
excess travel time. The reason is what is referred to in the transportation economics literature 
as Mohring economies of scale. A doubling of capacity and passenger-kilometres has minimal 
effect on the in-vehicle travel time per kilometre, but reduces both waiting time (due to an 
59 There are three major components to mass-transit travel time: time in transit, walking time, and waiting time. Due to 
boardings and alightings, the congested component of time in transit depends on the mass-transit volume-capacity ratio. 
There is no congested component of walking time. However, mean walking time depends on the mass-transit-network 
density, which depends on the level of mass-transit infrastructure. The most difficult component to treat is waiting time. 
If either mass-transit does not run on time or commuters do not know the schedule, waiting time is inversely related to 
service frequency, which can be expected to increase with the mass-transit volume-capacity ratio. Here it is assumed that 
commuters know the schedule, so that waiting time is zero. 
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increase in schedule frequency) and walking time (due to an increase in the network density).60 
The current consensus is that auto travel exhibits approximately constant returns to scale. 
The next pair of equations are simply identities:
  Tm ≡ smdm and Ta ≡ sada   (B.4)
Each states simply that the average increase in excess travel time per trip equals the average 
increase in excess travel time per mile times the average number of miles per trip. The final 
equations are the analogs to (B.4) for the free-flow component of travel time.61 
  Fm ≡ fmdm and Fa ≡ fada   (B.5)
Substituting (B.4) and (B.5) into (B.1) reduces the equation system to three equations in the 
three unknowns, M, sm, and sa. Rewriting the equation system in terms of growth rates yields
  gM = EM:Zm [gTm(T
m/Zm) + gFm(F
m/Zm)] + E
M:Za
 [gTa(T
a/Za) + gFa(F
a/Za)]  (B.6)
  g1- M = - [M/(1 - M)]gM        (B.7)
  gTm = gsm + gdm = Esm:MNdm(gM + gN + gdm) + Esm:KmgKm    (B.8)
  gTa = gsa + gda = Esa:MNda(g1-M + gN + gda) + Esa:KagKa    (B.9)
  gFm = gdm = gd gFa = gda = gd       (B.10)
Equation (B.10) incorporates the assumptions that the growth rate in mean trip distance is 
the same for both modes, and that for each mode, free-flow travel time per kilometre remains 
constant. Of central interest is how mean commuting time evolves over time. The mean 
commuting time on mode i is (si + fi)di. Thus, the overall mean commuting time, Z, is
  Z = M(sm + fm)dm + (1 - M)(sa + fa)da.      (B.11)
Table B gives the parameter estimates, as well as their justification. The exogenous elasticities 
and growth rates corresponding to the various cases are given in the body of the paper. 
60 The Calgary Transportation Plan proposes to extend the existing LRT lines and to add new lines, not to increase the density 
of stops. 
61 
There are three components of the free-flow-component mass-transit trip time: in-transit travel time, walking time (at both 
the origin and the destination), and waiting time. It is reasonable to assume that the free-flow-component in-transit travel 
time is a multiple of trip distance. Since the average circumferential distance to the nearest LRT line is proportional to the 
distance from the CBD, it is also reasonable to assume that walking time is proportional to trip distance. Waiting time has 
been assumed to be zero. 
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TABLE B PARAMETER ESTIMATES EMPLOYED IN CALCULATING THE GROWTH RATE OF MEAN COMMUTING  
  TIMES UNDER VARIOUS SCENARIOS
Parameter Interpretation Estimate Source
EM:Zm
Elasticity of transit modal share with respect to transit-trip 
time -0.129
1
EM:Za
Elasticity of transit modal share with respect to auto-trip 
time 0.036
2
Esm:MNdm
Elasticity of excess transit travel time per mile with respect 
to total transit passenger-kilometres (transit capital stock 
fixed)
0.9
This assumes that a 10 per cent increase in transit-rider 
miles, holding fixed the transit capital stock (and hence 
service frequency), results in a nine per cent increase in the 
excess mass-transit time per mile, reflecting the time lost 
due to boarding and alighting.
Esm:Km
Elasticity of transit congested travel time per kilometre with 
respect to transit capital stock (transit passenger-kilometres 
fixed)
-1.0
This assumes that a 10 per cent increase in transit capital 
stock results in a 10 per cent decrease in excess mass-transit 
travel time per kilometre. This elasticity and the previous 
one together capture modest increasing returns to scale in 
mass-transit.
gKm Annual growth rate of transit capital stock 0.02
This corresponds to a 328 per cent increase in the LRT 
capital stock over the plan period.
Esa:(1-M)Nda
Elasticity of excess auto travel time per kilometre with 
respect to total auto kilometres (auto capital stock fixed) 1.5
3
Esa:Ka
Elasticity of auto congested travel time per kilometre with 
respect to auto capital stock (auto kilometres fixed) -1.5
This elasticity and the previous one together capture 
approximately constant returns to scale in auto travel.
gKa Annual growth rate of auto capital stock 0.01
This corresponds to an 85 per cent increase in the auto 
capital stock over the period.4
Notes: 
1. Litman62 gives a morning-rush-hour elasticity of transit ridership with respect to transit travel time for Portland, Ore. 
of -0.129. Portland is known for its high mass-transit modal share compared to U.S. cities of comparable size. EM:Tm,, 
in contrast, is the rush-hour elasticity of transit modal share with respect to excess transit travel time. Assuming 
that, on average during the rush hour, excess transit travel time is one-third transit travel time, and that the Calgary 
elasticity is three times as high as the Portland elasticity, EM:Tm has the same value as the Litman elasticity.
2. Litman63 gives the morning-rush-hour elasticity of transit ridership with respect to auto travel time for Portland 
of 0.036. EM:Ta, in contrast, is the rush-hour elasticity of transit modal share with respect to excess auto travel 
time. Assuming that, on average during the rush hour, the excess auto time is one-third auto travel time (which is 
consistent with TomTom64), and that the Calgary elasticity is three times as high as the Portland elasticity, EM:Ta has 
the same value as the Litman elasticity.
3. There is no consensus in the literature on this important elasticity. The U.S. Federal Highway Administration’s 
estimate of this elasticity for single links is 3.5, while in the bottleneck model it is 1.0. For an entire urban area, the 
elasticity is likely significantly lower than that for a single link, since as traffic volume increases, commuters will on 
average take more circuitous, less congestible routes to avoid heavy congestion. 
4. This may seem modest. However, the city seems to be committed to a policy of minimal expansion of the road 
system over the plan period. For example, between 2011 and 2013, the number of lane-kilometers of “skeletal roads,” 
major roads, and collectors increased from 6,568 to 6,724, which corresponds to an annual growth rate of 1.18 per 
cent.65
Substituting these parameter values into (B.6) through (B.8) yields
gM = -0.129[gTm(T
m/Zm) + gFm(F
m/Zm)] + 0.036[gTa(T
a/Za) + gFa(F
a/Za)]   (B.6’) 
g1-M = - [M/(1 - M)]gM        (B.7’)
gTm = 0.9(gM + gN + gdm) -0.02       (B.8’)
62 Litman, “Understanding transport,” Table 31.
63 ibid.
64 TomTom index, 2013.
65 City of Calgary, data request, area and land-kilometres of roads, 2011-2013.
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gTa = 1.5(g1-M + gN + gda) -0.015       (B.9’)
gFm = gdm = gd and  gFa = gda = gd      (B.10’)
According to the National Household Survey, 2011,66 the average mass-transit commute time and 
the average auto commute time for Calgary are 41.4 minutes and 24.7 minutes respectively. The 
literature search uncovered no estimates of average free-flow commute time for either mode. 
However, the TomTom auto-congestion index indicates that average rush-hour commute time 
for auto travel is about 1.5 times the free-flow commute time, which would imply that free-flow 
auto commute time is 16.47 minutes and that excess auto commute time is 8.23 minutes. These 
are taken as the 2008 values for Calgary. An analogous assumption is made for mass-transit,67 
so that mass-transit free-flow travel time is 27.6 minutes and excess mass-transit time is 13.8 
minutes. Thus, in 2008, Fm = 27.6, Tm = 13.8, Zm = 41.4, F
a
 = 16.47, T
a = 8.23, and Za = 24.7. From 
(B.11), the value of Z in 2008 is 28.875.
The growth rates will change as the modal share and the ratio of excess to free-flow travel time 
on each of the two modes change. It was assumed in the text that in 2008 M = 0.25, so that M/
(1 - M) = 0.3333.
The procedure for solving this system is now illustrated for Case I: Plan population growth rate, 
and spatial containment.
 Case I: gN = 0.01275, gdm= gda = gd = 0, gN + gdm = 0.01275.
The expressions for gTm and gTa from (B.8’) and (B.9’), respectively, are substituted into (B.6’), to 
get an expression for gM as a function of exogenous parameters only. The value of gM in 2008 is 
then calculated, using the base-year values of the free-flow and excess components of travel time 
by the two modes. The calculated value of gM in 2008 is then substituted into (B.8’) and (B.9’) 
to obtain gTm and gTa for 2008. As well, under the policy of spatial containment, gd = 0. Applying 
these calculated growth rates, the 2009 values of M, Tm and Ta are calculated, and then the 
process is repeated year by year up to 2070. The above procedure is then repeated for the other 
three cases.
66 Statistics Canada, National Household Survey, 2011.
67 A more satisfying treatment would separate mass-transit time into walking time, waiting time, and in-vehicle travel time. 
Walking time would depend on the density of the network; waiting time would depend on the headway between trains 
(which depends in turn on the utilization rate of trains over the rush hour and the speed of trains); and in-vehicle travel time 
would depend on the passenger/LRT-car ratio, since this determines the length of time an LRT train waits at a station for 
passengers to alight and embark. 
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